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“Sabotage” is a derivative of “sabot,” which is French for a wooden shoe.
It means going slow, with a dragging, clumsy movement, such as that
manner of footgear may be expected to bring on. So it has come to describe
any manoeuvre of slowing-down, inefficiency, bungling, obstruction. In
American usage the word is very often taken to mean forcible obstruction,
destructive tactics, industrial frightfulness, incendiarism and high explosives,
although that is plainly not its first meaning nor its common meaning. Nor
is that its ordinary meaning as the word is used among those who have
advocated a recourse to sabotage as a means of enforcing an argument about
wages or the conditions of work. The ordinary meaning of the word is better
defined by an expression which has latterly come into use among the I. W.
W., “conscientious withdrawal of efficiency” — although that phrase does
not cover all that is rightly to be included under this technical term. The
sinister meaning which is often attached to the word in American usage, as
denoting violence and disorder, appears to be due to the fact that the
American usage has been shaped chiefly by persons and newspapers who
have aimed to discredit the use of sabotage by organized workmen, and who
have therefore laid stress on its less amiable manifestations. This is unfortu-
nate. It lessens the usefulness of the word by making it a means of denuncia-
tion rather than of understanding. No doubt violent obstruction has had its
share in the strategy of sabotage as carried on by disaffected workmen, as
well as in the similar tactics of rival business concerns. It comes into the case
as one method of sabotage, though by no means the most usual or the most
effective; but it is so spectacular and shocking a method that it has drawn
undue attention to itself. Yet such deliberate violence is, no doubt, a
relatively minor fact in the case, as compared with that deliberate malinger-
ing, confusion, and misdirection of work that makes up the bulk of what theThorstein Veblen,  The Engineers and the Price System, 5
expert practitioners would recognize as legitimate sabotage. The word first
came into use among the organized French workmen, the members of certain
syndicats, to describe their tactics of passive resistance, and it has continued
to be associated with the strategy of these French workmen, who are known
as syndicalists, and with their like-minded running-mates in other countries.
But the tactics of these syndicalists, and their use of sabotage, do not differ,
except in detail, from the tactics of other workmen elsewhere, or from the
similar tactics of friction, obstruction, and delay habitually employed, from
time to time, by both employees and employers to enforce an argument
about wages and prices. Therefore, in the course of a quarter-century past,
the word has quite unavoidably taken on a general meaning in common
speech, and has been extended to cover all such peaceable or surreptitious
manoeuvres of delay, obstruction, friction, and defeat, whether employed by
the workmen to enforce their claims, or by the employers to defeat their
employees, or by competitive business concerns to get the better of their
business rivals or to secure their own advantage. Such manoeuvres of
restriction, delay, and hindrance have a large share in the ordinary conduct
of business; but it is only lately that this ordinary line of business strategy has
come to be recognized as being substantially of the same nature as the
ordinary tactics of the syndicalists. So that it has not been usual until the last
few years to speak of manoeuvres of this kind as sabotage when they are
employed by employers and their business concerns. But all this strategy of
delay, restriction, hindrance, and defeat is manifestly of the same character,
and should conveniently be called by the same name, whether it is carried on
by business men or by workmen; so that it is no longer unusual now to find
workmen speaking of “capitalistic sabotage” as freely as the employers and
the newspapers speak of syndicalist sabotage. As the word is now used, and
as it is properly used, it describes a certain system of industrial strategy or
management, whether it is employed by one or another. What it describes is
a resort to peaceable or surreptitious restriction, delay, withdrawal, orThorstein Veblen,  The Engineers and the Price System, 6
obstruction.
Sabotage commonly works within the law, although it may often be within
the letter rather than the spirit of the law. It is used to secure some special
advantage or preference, usually of a businesslike sort. It commonly has to
do with something in the nature of a vested right, which one or another of
the parties in the case aims to secure or defend, or to defeat or diminish;
some preferential right or special advantage in respect of income or privilege,
something in the way of a vested interest. Workmen have resorted to such
measures to secure improved conditions of work, or increased wages, or
shorter hours, or to maintain their habitual standards, to all of which they
have claimed to have some sort of a vested right. Any strike is of the nature
of sabotage, of course. Indeed, a strike is a typical species of sabotage. That
strikes have not been spoken of as sabotage is due to the accidental fact that
strikes were in use before this word came into use. So also, of course, a
lockout is another typical species of sabotage. That the lockout is employed
by the employers against the employees does not change the fact that it is a
means of defending a vested right by delay, withdrawal, defeat, and
obstruction of the work to be done. Lockouts have not usually been spoken
of as sabotage, for the same reason that holds true in the case of strikes. All
the while it has been recognized that strikes and lockouts are of identically
the same character.
All this does not imply that there is anything discreditable or immoral
about this habitual use of strikes and lockouts. They are part of the ordinary
conduct of industry under the existing system, and necessarily so. So long as
the system remains unchanged these measures are a necessary and legitimate
part of it. By virtue of his ownership the owner-employer has a vested right
to do as he will with his own property, to deal or not to deal with any person
that offers, to withhold or withdraw any part or all of his industrial
equipment and natural resources from active use for the time being, to run
on half time or to shut down his plant and to lock out all those persons forThorstein Veblen,  The Engineers and the Price System, 7
whom he has no present use on his own premises. There is no question that
the lockout is altogether a legitimate manoeuvre. It may even be meritorious,
and it is frequently considered to be meritorious when its use helps to
maintain sound conditions in business—that is to say profitable condi-
tions—as frequently happens. Such is the view of the substantial citizens. So
also is the strike legitimate, so long as it keeps within the law; and it may at
times even be meritorious, at least in the eyes of the strikers. It is to be
admitted quite broadly that both of these typical species of sabotage are
altogether fair and honest in principle, although it does not therefore follow
that every strike or every lockout is necessarily fair and honest in its
working-out. That is in some degree a question of special circumstances.
Sabotage, accordingly, is not to be condemned out of hand, simply as such.
There are many measures of policy and management both in private business
and in public administration which are unmistakably of the nature of
sabotage and which are not only considered to be excusable, but are
deliberately sanctioned by statute and common law and by the public
conscience. Many such measures are quite of the essence of the case under
the established system of law and order, price and business, and are
faithfully believed to be indispensable to the common good. It should not be
difficult to show that the common welfare in any community which is
organized on the price system cannot be maintained without a salutary use
of sabotage — that it to say, such habitual recourse to delay and obstruction
of industry and such restriction of output as will maintain prices at a
reasonably profitable level and so guard against business depression. Indeed,
it is precisely considerations of this nature that are now engaging the best
attention of officials and business men in their endeavors to tide over a
threatening depression in American business and a consequent season of
hardship for all those persons whose main dependence is free income from
investments.
Without some salutary restraint in the way of sabotage on the productiveThorstein Veblen,  The Engineers and the Price System, 8
use of the available industrial plant and workmen, it is altogether unlikely
that prices could be maintained at a reasonably profitable figure for any
appreciable time. A businesslike control of the rate and volume of output is
indispensable for keeping up a profitable market, and a profitable market is
the first and unremitting condition of prosperity in any community whose
industry is owned and managed by business men. And the ways and means
of this necessary control of the output of industry are always and necessarily
something in the nature of sabotage — something in the way of retardation,
restriction, withdrawal, unemployment of plant and workmen — whereby
production is kept short of productive capacity.
The mechanical industry of the new order is inordinately productive. So the
rate and volume of output have to be regulated with a view to what the
traffic will bear — that is to say, what will yield the largest net return in
terms of price to the business men who manage the country's industrial
system. Otherwise there will be “overproduction,” business depression, and
consequent hard times all around. Overproduction means production in
excess of what the market will carry off at a sufficiently profitable price. So
it appears that the continued prosperity of the country from day to day hangs
on a “conscientious withdrawal of efficiency” by the business men who
control the country's industrial output. They control it all for their own use,
of course, and their own use means always a profitable price. In any
community that is organized on the price system, with investment and
business enterprise, habitual unemployment of the available industrial plant
and workmen, in whole or in part, appears to be the indispensable condition
without which tolerable conditions of life cannot be maintained. That is to
say, in no such community can the industrial system be allowed to work at
full capacity for any appreciable interval of time, on pain of business
stagnation and consequent privation for all classes and conditions of men.
The requirements of profitable business will not tolerate it. So the rate and
volume of output must be adjusted to the needs of the market, not to theThorstein Veblen,  The Engineers and the Price System, 9
working capacity of the available resources, equipment and man power, nor
to the community's need of consumable goods. Therefore there must always
be a certain variable margin of unemployment of plant and man power. Rate
and volume of output can, of course, not be adjusted by exceeding the
productive capacity of the industrial system. So it has to be regulated by
keeping short of maximum production by more or less as the condition of the
market may require. It is always a question of more or less unemployment
of plant and man power, and a shrewd moderation in the unemployment of
these available resources, a “conscientious withdrawal of efficiency,”
therefore, is the beginning of wisdom in all sound workday business
enterprise that has to do with industry.
All this is matter of course, and notorious. But it is not a topic on which one
prefers to dwell. Writers and speakers who dilate on the meritorious exploits
of the nation's business men will not commonly allude to this voluminous
running administration of sabotage, this conscientious withdrawal of
efficiency, that goes into their ordinary day's work. One prefers to dwell on
those exceptional, sporadic, and spectacular episodes in business where
business men have now and again successfully gone out of the safe and sane
highway of conservative business enterprise that is hedged about with a
conscientious withdrawal of efficiency, and have endeavored to regulate the
output by increasing the productive capacity of the industrial system at one
point or another.
But after all, such habitual recourse to peaceable or surreptitious measures
of restraint, delay, and obstruction in the ordinary businesslike management
of industry is too widely known and too well approved to call for much
exposition or illustration. Yet, as one capital illustration of the scope and
force of such businesslike withdrawal of efficiency, it may be in place to
recall that all the civilized nations are just now undergoing an experiment in
businesslike sabotage on an unexampled scale and carried out with
unexampled effrontery. All these nations that have come through the war,Thorstein Veblen,  The Engineers and the Price System, 10
whether as belligerents or as neutrals, have come into a state of more or less
pronounced distress, due to a scarcity of the common necessaries of life; and
this distress falls, of course, chiefly on the common sort, who have at the
same time borne the chief burden of the war which has brought them to this
state of distress. The common man has won the war and lost his livelihood.
This need not be said by way of praise or blame. As it stands it is, broadly,
an objective statement of fact, which may need some slight qualification,
such as broad statements of fact will commonly need. All these nations that
have come through the war, and more particularly the common run of their
populations, are very much in need of all sorts of supplies for daily use, both
for immediate consumption and for productive use. So much so that the
prevailing state of distress rises in many places to an altogether unwhole-
some pitch of privation, for want of the necessary food, clothing, shelter, and
fuel. Yet in all these countries the staple industries are slowing down. There
is an ever increasing withdrawal of efficiency. The industrial plant is
increasingly running idle or half idle, running increasingly short of its
productive capacity. Workmen are being laid off and an increasing number
of those workmen who have been serving in the armies are going idle for
want of work, at the same time that the troops which are no longer needed
in the service are being demobilized as slowly as popular sentiment will
tolerate, apparently for fear that the number of unemployed workmen in the
country may presently increase to such proportions as to bring on a
catastrophe. And all the while all these peoples are in great need of all sorts
of goods and services which these idle plants and idle workmen are fit to
produce. But for reasons of business expediency it is impossible to let these
idle plants and idle workmen go to work — that is to say for reasons of
insufficient profit to the business men interested, or in other words, for the
reasons of insufficient income to the vested interests which control the staple
industries and so regulate the output of product. The traffic will not bear so
large a production of goods as the community needs for current consump-Thorstein Veblen,  The Engineers and the Price System, 11
tion, because it is considered doubtful whether so large a supply could be
sold at prices that would yield a reasonable profit on the investment — or
rather on the capitalization; that is to say, it is considered doubtful whether
an increased production, such as to employ more workmen and supply the
goods needed by the community, would result in an increased net aggregate
income for the vested interests which control these industries. A reasonable
profit always means, in effect, the largest obtainable profit.
All this is simple and obvious, and it should scarcely need explicit
statement. It is for these business men to manage the country's industry, of
course, and therefore to regulate the rate and volume of output; and also of
course any regulation of the output by them will be made with a view to the
needs of business; that is to say, with a view to the largest obtainable net
profit, not with a view to the physical needs of these peoples who have come
through the war and have made the world safe for the business of the vested
interests. Should the business men in charge, by any chance aberration, stray
from this straight and narrow path of business integrity, and allow the
community's needs unduly to influence their management of the commu-
nity's industry, they would presently find themselves discredited and would
probably face insolvency. Their only salvation is a conscientious withdrawal
of efficiency. All this lies in the nature of the case. It is the working of the
price system, whose creatures and agents these business men are. Their case
is rather pathetic, as indeed they admit quite volubly. They are not in a
position to manage with a free hand, the reason being that they have in the
past, under the routine requirements of the price system as it takes effect in
corporation finance, taken on so large an overhead burden of fixed charges
that any appreciable decrease in the net earnings of the business will bring
any well-managed concern of this class face to face with bankruptcy.
At the present conjuncture, brought on by the war and its termination, the
case stands somewhat in this typical shape. In the recent past earnings have
been large; these large earnings (free income) have been capitalized; theirThorstein Veblen,  The Engineers and the Price System, 12
capitalized value has been added to the corporate capital and covered with
securities bearing a fixed income-charge; this income-charge, representing
free income, has thereby become a liability on the earnings of the corpora-
tion; this liability cannot be met in case the concern's net aggregate earnings
fall off in any degree; therefore prices must be kept up to such a figure as will
bring the largest net aggregate return, and the only means of keeping up
prices is a conscientious withdrawal of efficiency in these staple industries
on which the community depends for a supply of the necessaries of life.
The business community has hopes of tiding things over by this means, but
it is still a point in doubt whether the present unexampled large use of
sabotage in the businesslike management of the staple industries will now
suffice to bring the business community through this grave crisis without a
disastrous shrinkage of its capitalization, and a consequent liquidation; but
the point is not in doubt that the physical salvation of these peoples who
have come through the war must in any case wait on the pecuniary salvation
of these owners of corporate securities which represent free income. It is a
sufficiently difficult passage. It appears that production must be curtailed in
the staple industries, on pain of unprofitable prices. The case is not so
desperate in those industries which have immediately to do with the
production of superfluities; but even these, which depend chiefly on the
custom of those kept classes to whom the free income goes, are not feeling
altogether secure. For the good of business it is necessary to curtail produc-
tion of the means of life, on pain of unprofitable prices, at the same time that
the increasing need of all sorts of the necessaries of life must be met in some
passable fashion, on pain of such popular disturbances as will always come
of popular distress when it passes the limit of tolerance.
Those wise business men who are charged with administering the salutary
modicum of sabotage at this grave juncture may conceivably be faced with
a dubious choice between a distasteful curtailment of the free income that
goes to the vested interests, on the one hand, and an unmanageable onset ofThorstein Veblen,  The Engineers and the Price System, 13
popular discontent on the other hand. And in either alternative lies disaster.
Present indications would seem to say that their choice will fall out according
to ancient habit, that they will be likely to hold fast by an undiminished free
income for the vested interests at the possible cost of any popular discontent
that may be in prospect — and then, with the help of the courts and the
military arm, presently make reasonable terms with any popular discontent
that may arise. In which event it should all occasion no surprise or resent-
ment, inasmuch as it would be nothing unusual or irregular and would
presumably be the most expeditious way of reaching a modus vivendi. During
the past few weeks, too, quite an unusually large number of machine guns
have been sold to industrial business concerns of the larger sort, here and
there, at least so they say. Business enterprise being the palladium of the
Republic, it is right to take any necessary measures for its safeguarding. Price
is of the essence of the case, whereas livelihood is not.
The grave emergency that has arisen out of the war and its provisional
conclusion is, after all, nothing exceptional except in magnitude and severity.
In substance it is the same sort of thing that goes on continually but
unobtrusively and as a matter of course in ordinary times of business as
usual. It is only that the extremity of the case is calling attention to itself. At
the same time it serves impressively to enforce the broad proposition that a
conscientious withdrawal of efficiency is the beginning of wisdom in all
established business enterprise that has to do with industrial production. But
it has been found that this grave interest which the vested interests always
have in a salutary retardation of industry at one point or another cannot well
be left altogether to the haphazard and ill-coordinated efforts of individual
business concerns, each taking care of its own particular line of sabotage
within its own premises. The needed sabotage can best be administered on
a comprehensive plan and by a central authority, since the country's industry
is of the nature of a comprehensive interlocking system, whereas the business
concerns which are called on to control the motions of this industrial systemThorstein Veblen,  The Engineers and the Price System, 14
will necessarily work piecemeal, in severalty and at cross-purposes. In effect,
their working at cross-purposes results in a sufficiently large aggregate
retardation of industry, of course, but the resulting retardation is necessarily
somewhat blindly apportioned and does not converge to a neat and
perspicuous outcome. Even a reasonable amount of collusion among the
interested business concerns will not by itself suffice to carry on that
comprehensive moving equilibrium of sabotage that is required to preserve
the business community from recurrent collapse or stagnation, or to bring the
nation's traffic into line with the general needs of the vested interests.
Where the national government is charged with the general care of the
country's business interests, as is invariably the case among the civilized
nations, it follows from the nature of the case that the nation's lawgivers and
administration will have some share in administering that necessary
modicum of sabotage that must always go into the day's work of carrying on
industry by business methods and for business purposes. The government
is in a position to penalize excessive or unwholesome traffic. So, it is always
considered necessary, or at least expedient, by all sound mercantilists, as by
a tariff or by subsidies, to impose and maintain a certain balance or
proportion among the several branches of industry and trade that go to make
up the nation's industrial system. The purpose commonly urged for
measures of this class is the fuller utilization of the nation's industrial
resources in material, equipment, and man power; the invariable effect is a
lowered efficiency and a wasteful use of these resources, together with an
increase of international jealousy. But measures of that kind are thought to
be expedient by the mercantilists for these purposes — that is to say, by the
statesmen of these civilized nations, for the purposes of the vested interests.
The chief and nearly the sole means of maintaining such a fabricated balance
and proportion among the nation's industries is to obstruct the traffic at some
critical point by prohibiting or penalizing any exuberant undesirables among
these branches of industry. Disallowance, in whole or in part, is the usualThorstein Veblen,  The Engineers and the Price System, 15
and standard method.
The great standing illustration of sabotage administered by the government
is the protective tariff, of course. It protects certain special in-terests by
obstructing competition from beyond the frontier. This is the main use of a
national boundary. The effect of the tariff is to keep the supply of goods
down and thereby keep the price up, and so to bring reasonably satisfactory
dividends to those special interests which deal in the protected articles of
trade, at the cost of the underlying community. A protective tariff is a
(typical conspiracy in restraint of trade. It brings a relatively small, though
absolutely large, run or free income to the special interests which benefit by
it, at a relatively, and absolutely, large cost to the underlying community,
and so it gives rise to a body of vested rights and intangible assets belonging
to these special interests.
Of a similar character, in so far that in effect they are in the nature of
sabotage — conscientious withdrawal of efficiency — are all manner of excise
and revenue-stamp regulations; although they are not always designed for
that purpose. Such would be, for instance, the partial or complete prohibition
of alcoholic beverages, the regulation of the trade in tobacco, opium, and
other deleterious narcotics, drugs, poisons, and high explosives. Of the same
nature, in effect if not in intention, are such regulations as the oleomargarine
law; as also the unnecessarily costly and vexatious routine of inspection
imposed on the production of industrial (denatured) alcohol, which has
inured to the benefit of certain business concerns that are interested in other
fuels for use in internal-combustion engines; so also the singularly vexatious
and elaborately imbecile specifications that limit and discourage the use of
the parcel post, for the benefit of the express companies and other carriers
which have a vested interest in traffic of that kind.
It is worth noting in the same connection, although it comes in from the
other side of the case, that ever since the express companies have been taken
over by the federal administration there has visibly gone into effect aThorstein Veblen,  The Engineers and the Price System, 16
comprehensive system of vexation and delay in the detail conduct of their
traffic, so contrived as to discredit federal control of this traffic and thereby
provoke a popular sentiment in favor of its early return to private control.
Much the same state of things has been in evidence in the railway traffic
under similar conditions. Sabotage is serviceable as a deterrent, whether in
furtherance of the administration's work or in contravention of it.
In what has just been said there is, of course, no intention to find fault with
any of these uses of sabotage. It is not a question of morals and good
intentions. It is always to be presumed as a matter of course that the guiding
spirit in all such governmental moves to regularize the nation's affairs,
whether by restraint or by incitement, is a wise solicitude for the nation's
enduring gain and security. All that can be said here is that many of these
wise measures of restraint and incitement are in the nature of sabotage, and
that in effect they habitually, though not invariably, inure to the benefit of
certain vested interests — ordinarily vested interests which bulk large in the
ownership and control of the nation's resources. That these measures are
quite legitimate and presumably salutary, therefore, goes without saying. In
effect they are measures for hindering traffic and industry at one point or
another, which may often be a wise business precaution.
During the period of the war administrative measures in the nature of
sabotage have been ereatly extended in scope and kind. Peculiar and
imperative exigencies have had to be met, and the staple means of meeting
many of these new and exceptional exigencies has quite reasonably been
something in the way of avoidance, disallowance, penalization, hindrance,
a conscientious withdrawal of efficiency from work that does not fall in with
the purposes of the Administration. Very much as is true in private business
when a situation of doubt and hazard presents itself, so also in the business
of government at the present juncture of exacting demands and inconvenient
limitations, the Administration has been driven to expedients of disallow-
ance and obstruction with regard to some of the ordinary processes of life,Thorstein Veblen,  The Engineers and the Price System, 17
as, for instance, in the non-essential industries. It has also appeared that the
ordinary equipment and agencies for gathering and distributing news and
other information have in the past developed a capacity far in excess of what
can safely be permitted in time of war or of returning peace. The like is true
for the ordinary facilities for public discussion of all sorts of public questions.
The ordinary facilities, which may have seemed scant enough in time of
peace and slack interest, had after all developed a capacity far beyond what
the governmental traffic will bear in these uneasy times of war and
negotiations, when men are very much on the alert to know what is going on.
By a moderate use of the later improvements in the technology of transport
and communication, the ordinary means of disseminating information and
opinions have grown so efficient that the traffic can no longer be allowed to
run at full capacity during a period of stress in the business of government.
Even the mail service has proved insufferably efficient, and a selective
withdrawal of efficiency has gone into effect. To speak after the analogy of
private business, it has been found best to disallow such use of the mail
facilities as does not inure to the benefit of the Administration in the way of
good will and vested rights of usufruct.
These peremptory measures of disallowance have attracted a wide and
dubious attention; but they have doubtless been of a salutary nature and
intention, in some way which is not to be understood by outsiders — that is
to say, by citizens of the Republic. An unguarded dissemination of informa-
tion and opinions or an unduly frank canvassing of the relevant facts by
these outsiders, will be a handicap on the Administration's work, and may
even defeat the Administration's aims. At least so they say.
Something of much the same color has been observed elsewhere and in
other times, so that all this nervously alert resort to sabotage on undesirable
information and opinions is nothing novel, nor is it peculiarly democratic.
The elder statesmen of the great monarchies, east and west, have long seen
and approved the like. But these elder statesmen of the dynastic regime haveThorstein Veblen,  The Engineers and the Price System, 18
gone to their work of sabotage on information because of a palpable division
of sentiment between their government and the underlying population, such
as does not exist in the advanced democratic commonwealths. The case of
Imperial Germany during the period of the war is believed to show such a
division of sentiment between the government and the underlying popula-
tion, and also to show how such a divided sentiment on the part of a
distrustful and distrusted population had best be dealt with. The method
approved by German dynastic experience is sabotage, of a somewhat free-
swung character, censorship, embargo on communication, and also, it is
confidently alleged, elaborate misinformation.
Such procedure on the part of the dynastic statesmen of the Empire is
comprehensible even to a layman. But how it all stands with those advanced
democratic nations, like America, where the government is the dispassion-
ately faithful agent and spokesman of the body of citizens, and where there
can consequently be no division of aims and sentiment between the body of
officials and any underlying population — all that is a more obscure and
hazardous subject of speculation. Yet there has been censorship, somewhat
rigorous, and there has been selective refusal of mail facilities, somewhat
arbitrary, in these democratic commonwealths also, and not least in America,
freely acknowledged to be the most naively democratic of them all. And all
the while one would like to believe that it all has somehow served some










It has been usual, and indeed it still is not unusual, to speak of three
coordinate “factors of production” : land, labor, and capital. The reason for
this threefold scheme of factors in production is that there have been three
recognized classes of income: rent, wages, and profits; and it has been
assumed that whatever yields an income is a productive factor. This scheme
has come down from the eighteenth century. It is presumed to have been
true, in a general way, under the conditions which prevailed in the eigh-
teenth century, and it has therefore also been assumed that it should continue
to be natural, or normal, true in some eminent sense, under any other
conditions that have come on since that time.
Seen in the light of later events this threefold plan of coordinate factors in
production is notable for what it omits. It assigns no productive effect to the
industrial arts, for example, for the conclusive reason that the state of the
industrial arts yields no stated or ratable income to any one class of persons;
it affords no legal claim to a share in the community's yearly production of
goods. The state of the industrial art is a joint stock of knowledge derived
from past experience, and is held and passed on as an indivisible possession
of the community at large. It is the indispensable foundation of all productive
industry, of course, but except for certain minute fragments covered by
patent rights or trade secrets, this joint stock is no man's individual property.
For this reason it has not been counted in as a factor in production. The
unexampled advance of technology during the past one hundred and fifty
years has now begun to call attention to its omission from the threefold plan
of productive factors handed down from that earlier time.
Another omission from the scheme of factors, as it was originally drawn,Thorstein Veblen,  The Engineers and the Price System, 20
was the business man. But in the course of the nineteenth century the
business man came more and more obtrusively to the front and came in for
a more and more generous portion of the country's yearly income — which
was taken to argue that he also contributed increasingly to the yearly
production of goods. So a fourth factor of production has provisionally been
added to the threefold scheme, in the person of the “entrepreneur,” whose
wages of management are considered to measure his creative share in the
production of goods, although there still is some question as to the precise
part of the entrepreneur in productive industry.
“Entrepreneur” is a technical term to designate the man who takes care of
the financial end of things. It covers the same fact as the more familiar
“business man,” but with a vague suggestion of big business rather than
small. The typical entrepreneur is the corporation financier. And since the
corporation financier has habitually come in for a very substantial share of
the community's yearly income he has also been conceived to render a very
substantial service to the community as a creative force in that productive
industry out of which the yearly income arises. Indeed, it is nearly true that
in current usage “producer” has come to mean “financial manager,” both in
the standard economic theory and in everyday speech.
There need of course be no quarrel with all this. It is a mattter of usage.
During the era of the machine industry — which is also the era of the
commercial democracy — business men have controlled production and
have managed the industry of the commonwealth for their own ends, so that
the material fortunes of all the civilized peoples have continued to turn on
the financial management of their business men. And during the same period
not only have the conditions of life among these civilized peoples continued
to be fairly tolerable on the whole, but it is also true that the industrial system
which these business men have been managing for their own private gain all
this time has continually been growing more efficient on the whole. Its
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grown larger. For this very creditable outcome due credit should be, as
indeed it has been, given to the business community which has had the
oversight of things. The efficient enlargement of industrial capacity has, of
course, been due to a continued advance in technology, to a continued
increase of the available natural resources, and to a continued increase of
population. But the business community have also had a part in bringing all
this to pass; they have always been in a position to hinder this growth, and
it is only by their consent and advice that things have been enabled to go
forward so far as they have gone.
This sustained advance in productive capacity, due to the continued
advance in technology and in population, has also had another notable
consequence. According to the Liberal principles of the eighteenth century
any legally defensible receipt of income is a sure sign of productive work
done. Seen in the light of this assumption, the visibly increasing productive
capacity of the industrial system has enabled all men of a liberal and
commercial mind not only to credit the businesslike captains of industry with
having created this productive capacity, but also to overlook all that the same
captains of industry have been doing in the ordinary course of business to
hold productive industry in check. And it happens that all this time things
have been moving in such a direction and have now gone so far that it is
today quite an open question whether the businesslike management of the
captains is not more occupied with checking industry than with increasing
its productive capacity.
This captain of industry, typified by the corporation financier, and latterly
by the investment banker, is one of the institutions that go to make up the
new order of things, which has been coming on among all the civilized
peoples ever since the Industrial Revolution set in. As such, as an institu-
tional growth, his life history hitherto should be worth looking into for any
one who proposes to understand the recent growth and present drift of this
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at their best among those enterprising Englishmen who made it their work
to carry the industrial promise of the Revolution out into tangible perfor-
mance, during the closing decades of the eighteenth and the early decades
of the nineteenth century. These captains of the early time are likely to be
rated as inventors, at least in a loose sense of the word. But it is more to the
point that they were designers and builders of factory, mill, and mine
equipment, of engines, processes, machines, and machine tools, as well as
shop managers, at the same time that they took care, more or less effectually,
of the financial end. Nowhere do these beginnings of the captain of industry
stand out so convincingly as among the English tool-builders of that early
time, who designed, tried out, built, and marketed that series of indispens-
able machine tools that has made the practical foundation of the mechanical
industry. Something to much the same effect is due to be said for the
pioneering work of the Americans along the same general lines of mechanical
design and performance at a slightly later period. To men of this class the
new industrial order owes much of its early success as well as of its later
growth.
These men were captains of industry, entrepreneurs, in some such simple
and comprehensive sense of the word as that which the economists appear
to have had in mind for a hundred years after, when they have spoken of the
wages of management that are due the entrepreneur for productive work
done. They were a cross between a business man and an industrial expert,
and the industrial expert appears to have been the more valuable half in their
composition. But factory, mine, and ship owners, as well as merchants and
bankers, also made up a vital part of that business community out of whose
later growth and specialization the corporation financier of the nineteenth
and twentieth centuries has arisen. His origins are both technological and
commercial, and in that early phase of his life history which has been taken
over into the traditions of economic theory and of common sense he carried
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the large scale, the wide sweep, and the profound specialization of the
advanced mechanical industry had gathered headway.
But progressively the cares of business management grew larger and more
exacting, as the scale of things in business grew larger, and so the directive
head of any such business concern came progressively to give his attention
more and more exclusively to the “financial end.” At the same time and
driven by the same considerations the businesslike management of industry
has progressively been shifting to the footing of corporation finance. This has
brought on a further division, dividing the ownership of the industrial
equipment and resources from their management. But also at the same time
the industrial system, on its technological side, has been progressively
growing greater and going farther in scope diversity, specialization, and
complexity, as well as in productive capacity per unit of equipment and man
power.
The last named item of change, the progressive increase of productive
capacity, is peculiarly significant in this connection. Through the earlier and
pioneering decades of the machine era it appears to have been passably true
that the ordinary routine of management in industrial business was taken up
with reaching out for new ways and means and speeding up production to
maximum capacity. That was befofe standardization of processes and of unit
products and fabrication of parts had been carried far, and therefore before
quantity production had taken on anything like its later range and reach.
And, partly because of that fact — because quantity production was then still
a slight matter and greatly circumscribed, as contrasted with its later growth
— the ordinary volume of output in the mechanical industries was still
relatively slight and manageable. Therefore those concerns that were
engaged in these industries still had a fairly open market for whatever they
might turn out, a market capable of taking up any reasonable increase of
output. Exceptions to this general rule occurred; as, e.g., in textiles. But the
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nineteenth century so far as regards English industry, and even more
obviously in the case of America. Such an open market meant a fair chance
for competitive production, without too much risk of overstocking. And
running to the same effect, there was the continued increase of population
and the continually increasing reach and volume of the means of transport,
serving to maintain a free market for any prospective increase of output, at
prices which offered a fair prospect of continued profit. In the degree in
which this condition of things prevailed a reasonably free competitive
production would be practicable.
The industrial situation so outlined began visibly to give way toward the
middle of the nineteenth century in England, and at a correspondingly later
period in America. The productive capacity of the mechanical industry was
visibly overtaking the capacity of the market, so that free competition
without afterthought was no longer a sound footing on which to manage
production. Loosely, this critical or transitional period falls in and about the
second quarter of the nineteenth century in England; elsewhere at a
correspondingly later date. Of course the critical point, when business
exigencies began to dictate a policy of combination and restriction, did not
come at the same date in all or in most of the mechanical industries; but it
seems possible to say that, by and large, the period of transition to a general
rule of restriction in industry conies on at the time and for the reason so
indicated. There were also other factors engaged in that industrial situation,
besides those spoken of above, less notable and less sharply defined, but
enforcing limitations of the same character. Such were, e.g., a rapidly gaining
obsolescence of industrial plant, due to improvements and extensions, as also
the partial exhaustion of the labor supply by persistent overwork, under-
feeding, and unsanitary conditions — but this applies to the English case
rather than elsewhere.
In point of time this critical period in the affairs of industrial business
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and typical method of controlling the industrial output. Of course the
corporation, or company, has other uses besides the restrictive control of the
output with a view to a profitable market, but it should be sufficiently
obvious that the combination of ownership and centralization of control
which the corporation brings about is also exceedingly convenient for that
purpose. And when it appears that the general resort to corporate organiza-
tion of the larger sort sets in about the time when business exigencies begin
to dictate an imperative restriction of output, it is not easy to avoid the
conclusion that this was one of the ends to be served by this reorganization
of business enterprise. Business enterprise may fairly be said to have shifted
from the footing of free-swung competitive production to that of a “consci-
entious withholding of efficiency,” so soon and so far as corporation finance
on a sufficiently large scale had come to be the controlling factor in industry.
At the same time and in the same degree the discretionary control of
industry, and of other business enterprise in great part, has passed into the
hands of the corporation financier. Corporate organization has continually
gone forward to a larger scale and a more comprehensive coalition of forces,
and at the same time, and more and more visibly, it has become the ordinary
duty of the corporate management to adjust production to the requirements
of the market by restricting the output to what the traffic will bear; that is to
say, what will yield the largest net earnings. Under corporate management
it rarely happens that production is pushed to the limit of capacity. It
happens, and can happen, only rarely and intermittently. This has been true,
increasingly, ever since the ordinary productive capacity of the mechanical
industries seriously began to overtake and promised to exceed what the
market would carry off at a reasonably profitable price. And ever since that
critical turn in the affairs of industrial business — somewhere in the middle
half of the nineteenth century — it has become increasingly imperative to use
a wise moderation and stop down the output to such a rate and volume as
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undivided attention on the part of the business men, and in an ever
increasing measure their day's work has come to center about a running
adjustment of sabotage on production. And for this purpose, evidently, the
corporate organization of this business, on an increasingly large scale, is very
serviceable, since the requisite sabotage on productive industry can be
effectually administered only on a large plan and with a firm hand.
“The leaders in business are men who have studied and thought all their
lives. They have thus learned to decide big problems at once, basing their
decisions upon their knowledge of fundamental principles.”—Jeremiah W.
Jenks. That is to say, the surveillance of this financial end of industrial
business, and the control of the requisite running balance of sabotage, have
been reduced to a routine governed by settled principles of procedure and
administered by suitably trained experts in corporation finance. But under
the limitations to which all human capacity is subject it follows from this
increasingly exacting discipline of business administration that the business
men are increasingly out of touch with that manner of thinking and those
elements of knowledge that go to make up the logic and the relevant facts of
the mechanical technology. Addiction to a strict and unremitting valuation
of all things in terms of price and profit leaves them, by settled habit, unfit
to appreciate those technological facts and values that can be formulated only
in terms of tangible mechanical performance; increasingly so with every
further move into a stricter addiction to businesslike management and with
every further advance of the industrial system into a still wider scope and a
still more diversified and more delicately balanced give and take among its
interlocking members.
They are experts in prices and profits and financial manoeuvres; and yet the
final discretion in all questions of industrial policy continues to rest in their
hands. They are by training and interest captains of finance; and yet, with no
competent grasp of the industrial arts, they continue to exercise a plenary
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routine of acquisition, in which they habitually reach their ends by a shrewd
restriction of output; and yet they continue to be entrusted with the
community's industrial welfare, which calls for maximum production.
Such has been the situation in all the civilized countries since corporation
finance has ruled industry, and until a recent date. Quite recently this settled
scheme of business management has shown signs of giving way, and a new
move in the organization of business enterprise has come in sight, whereby
the discretionary control of industrial production is shifting still farther over
to the side of finance and still farther out of touch with the requirements of
maximum production. The new move is of a twofold character: (a) the
financial captains of industry have been proving their industrial incompe-
tence in a progressively convincing fashion, and (b) their own proper work
of financial management has progressively taken on a character of standard-
ized routine such as no longer calls for or admits any large measure of
discretion or initiative. They have been losing touch with the management
of industrial processes, at the same time that the management of corporate
business has, in effect, been shifting into the hands of a bureaucratic clerical
staff. The corporation financier of popular tradition is taking on the character
of a chief of bureau.
The changes which have brought the corporation financier to this somewhat
inglorious position of a routine administrator set in along with the early
growth of corporation finance, somewhere around the middle of the
nineteenth century, and they have come to a head somewhere about the
passage to the twentieth century, although it is only since the latter date that
the outcome is becoming at all clearly defined. When corporate organization
and the consequent control of output came into bearing there were two lines
of policy open to the management: (a) to maintain profitable prices by
limiting the output, and (b) to maintain profits by lowering the production
cost of an increased output. To some extent both of these lines were followed,
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and it required less acquaintance with the working processes of industry. At
least it appears that in effect the preference was increasingly given to the
former method during this half-century of financial management. For this
there were good reasons. The processes of production were continually
growing more extensive, diversified, complicated, and more difficult for any
layman in technology to comprehend — and the corporation financier was
such a layman, necessarily and increasingly so, for reasons indicated above.
At the same time, owing to a continued increase of population and a
continued extension of the industrial system, the net product of industry and
its net earnings continued to increase independently of any creative effort on
the part of the financial management. So the corporation financier, as a class,
came in for an “unearned increment” of income, on the simple plan of
“sitting tight.” That plan is intelligible to any layman. All industrial
innovation and all aggressive economy in the conduct of industry not only
presumes an insight into the technological details of the industrial process,
but to any other than the technological experts, who know the facts
intimately, any move of that kind will appear hazardous. So the business
men who have controlled industry, being laymen in all that concerns its
management, have increasingly been content to let well enough alone and to
get along with an ever increasing overhead charge of inefficiency, so long as
they have lost nothing by it. The result has been an ever increasing volume
of waste and misdirection in the use of equipment, resources, and man
power throughout the industrial system.
In time, that is to say within the last few years, the resulting lag, leak, and
friction in the ordinary working of this mechanical industry under business
management have reached such proportions that no ordinarily intelligent
outsider can help seeing them wherever he may look into the facts of the
case. But it is the industrial experts, not the business men, who have finally
begun to criticize this businesslike mismanagement and neglect of the ways
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no cordial response from the business men in charge, who have, on the
whole, continued to let well enough alone — that is to say, what is well
enough for a short-sighted business policy looking to private gain, however
poorly it may serve the material needs of the community. But in the
meantime two things have been happening which have deranged the regime
of the corporation financier: industrial experts, engineers, chemists,
mineralogists, technicians of all kinds, have been drifting into more
responsible positions in the industrial system and have been growing up and
multiplying within the system, because the system will no longer work at all
without them; and on the other hand, the large financial interests on whose
support the corporation financiers have been leaning have gradually come
to realize that corporation finance can best be managed as a comprehensive
bureaucratic routine, and that the two pillars of the house of corporate
business enterprise of the larger sort are the industrial experts and the large
financial concerns that control the necessary funds; whereas the corporation
financier is little more than a dubious intermediate term between these two.
One of the greater personages in American business finance took note of
this situation in the late nineties and set about turning it to account for the
benefit of himself and his business associates, and from that period dates a
new era in American corporation finance. It was for a time spoken of loosely
as the Era of Trust-Making, but that phrase does not describe it at all
adequately. It should rather be called the Era of the Investment Banker, and
it has come to its present stage of maturity and stability only in the course of
the past quarter-century.
The characteristic features and the guiding purpose of this improved
method in corporation finance are best shown by a showing of the methods
and achievements of that great pioneer by whom it was inaugurated. As an
illustrative case, then, the American steel business in the nineties was
suffering from the continued use of out-of-date processes, equipment, and
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ignorant corporation officials, and particularly from intermittent haphazard
competition and mutual sabotage between the numerous concerns which
were then doing business in steel. It appears to have been the last-named
difficulty that particularly claimed the attention and supplied the opportu-
nity of the great pioneer. He can by no stretch of charity be assumed to have
had even a slight acquaintance with the technological needs and shortcom-
ings of the steel industry. But to a man of commercial vision and financial
sobriety it was plain that a more comprehensive, and therefore more
authoritative, organization and control of the steel business would readily
obviate much of the competition which was deranging prices. The apparent
purpose and the evident effect of the new and larger coalition of business
interests in steel was to maintain profitable prices by a reasonable curtail-
ment of production. A secondary and less evident effect was a more
economical management of the industry, which involved some displacement
of quondam corporation financiers and some introduction of industrial
experts. A further, but unavowed, end to be served by the same move in each
of the many enterprises in coalition undertaken by the great pioneer and by
his competitors was a bonus that came to these enterprising men in the shape
of an increased capitalization of the business. But the notable feature of it all
as seen from the point of view of the public at large was always the
stabilization of prices at a reasonably high level, such as would always assure
reasonably large earnings on the increased capitalization.
Since then this manner of corporation finance has been further perfected
and standardized, until it will now hold true that no large move in the field
of corporation finance can be made without the advice and consent of those
large funded interests that are in a position to act as investment bankers; nor
does any large enterprise in corporation business ever escape from the
continued control of the investment bankers in any of its larger transactions;
nor can any corporate enterprise of the larger sort now continue to do
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of income to the investment bankers, whose continued support is necessary
to its success.
The financial interest here spoken of as the investment banker is commonly
something in the way of a more or less articulate syndicate of financial
houses, and it is to be added that the same financial concerns are also
commonly, if not invariably, engaged or interested in commercial banking
of the usual kind. So that the same well-established, half-syndicated
ramification of banking houses that have been taking care of the country's
commercial banking, with its center of credit and of control at the country's
financial metropolis, is ready from beforehand to take over and administer
the country's corporation finance on a unified plan and with a view to an
equitable distribution of the country's net earnings among themselves and
their clients. The more inclusive this financial organization is, of course, the
more able it will be to manage the country's industrial system as an inclusive
whole and prevent any hazardous innovation or experiment, as well as to
limit production of the necessaries to such a volume of output as will yield
the largest net return to itself and its clients.
Evidently the improved plan which has thrown the discretion and
responsibility into the hands of the investment banker should make for a safe
and sound conduct of business, such as will avoid fluctuations of price, and
more particularly avoid any unprofitable speeding-up of productive
industry. Evidently, too, the initiative has hereby passed out of the hands of
the corporation financier, who has fallen into the position of a financial
middleman or agent, with limited discretion and with a precariously
doubtful future. But all human institutions are susceptible of improvement,
and the course of improvement may now and again, as in his case, result in
supersession and displacement. And doubtless it is all for the best, that is to
say, for the good of business, more particularly for the profit of big business.
But now as always corporation finance is a traffic in credit; indeed, now
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in the hands of this inclusive quasi-syndicate of banking interests it is
necessary that the credit system of the country should as a whole be
administered on a unified plan and inclusively. All of which is taken care of
by the same conjunction of circumstances; the same quasi-syndicate of
banking interests that makes use of the country's credit in the way of
corporation finance is also the guardian of the country's credit at large. From
which it results that, as regards those large-scale credit extensions which are
of substantial consequence, the credits and debits are, in effect, pooled within
the syndicate, so that no substantial derangement of the credit situation can
take effect except by the free choice of this quasi-syndicate of investment
banking houses; that is to say, not except they see an advantage to them-
selves in allowing the credit situation to be deranged, and not beyond the
point which will best serve their collective purpose as against the rest of the
community. With such a closed system no extension of credit obligations or
multiplication of corporate securities, with the resulting inflation of values,
need bring any risk of a liquidation, since credits and debits are in effect
pooled within the system. By way of parenthesis it may also be remarked
that under these circumstances “credit” has no particular meaning except as
a method of accounting. Credit is also one of the timeworn institutions that
are due to suffer obsolescence by improvement.
This process of pooling and syndication that is remaking the world of credit
and corporation finance has been greatly helped on in America by the
establishment of the Federal Reserve system, while somewhat similar results
have been achieved elsewhere by somewhat similar devices. That system has
greatly helped to extend, facilitate, simplify, and consolidate the unified
control of the country's credit arrangements, and it has very conveniently left
the substantial control in the hands of those larger financial interests into
whose hands the lines of control in credit and industrial business were
already being gathered by force of circumstances and by sagacious manage-
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country's credit system is gathered into a self-balanced whole, closed and
unbreakable, self-insured against all risk and derangement. All of which
converges to the definitive stabilization of the country's business; but since
it reduces financial traffic to a riskless routine it also converges to the
conceivable obsolescence of corporation finance and eventually, perhaps, of





In more than one respect the industrial system of today is notably different
from anything that has gone before. It is eminently a system, self-balanced
and comprehensive; and it is a system of interlocking mechanical processes,
rather than of skilful manipulation. It is mechanical rather than manual. It is
an organization of mechanical powers and material resources, rather than of
skilled craftsmen and tools; although the skilled workmen and tools are also
an indispensable part of its comprehensive mechanism. It is of an impersonal
nature, after the fashion of the material sciences, on which it constantly
draws. It runs to “quantity production” of specialized and standardized
goods and services. For all these reasons it lends itself to systematic control
under the direction of industrial experts, skilled technologists, who may be
called “production engineers,” for want of a better term.
This industrial system runs on as an inclusive organization of many and
diverse interlocking mechanical processes, interdependent and balanced
among themselves in such a way that the due working of any part of it is
conditioned on the due working of all the rest. Therefore it will work at its
best only on condition that these industrial experts, production engineers,
will work together on a common understanding; and more particularly on
condition that they must not work at cross purposes. These technological
specialists whose constant supervision is indispensable to the due working
of the industrial system constitute the general staff of industry, whose work
it is to control the strategy of production at large and to keep an oversight of
the tactics of production in detail.
Such is the nature of this industrial system on whose due working depends
the material welfare of all the civilized peoples. It is an inclusive systemThorstein Veblen,  The Engineers and the Price System, 35
drawn on a plan of strict and comprehensive interdependence, such that, in
point of material welfare, no nation and no community has anything to gain
at the cost of any other nation or community. In point of material welfare, all
the civilized peoples have been drawn together by the state of the industrial
arts into a single going concern. And for the due working of this inclusive
going concern it is essential that that corps of technological specialists who
by training, insight, and interest make up the general staff of industry must
have a free hand in the disposal of its available resources, in materials,
equipment, and man power, regardless of any national pretensions or any
vested interests. Any degree of obstruction, diversion, or withholding of any
of the available industrial forces, with a view to the special gain of any nation
or any investor, unavoidably brings on a dislocation of the system; which
involves a disproportionate lowering of its working efficiency and therefore
a disproportionate loss to the whole, and therefore a net loss to all its parts.
And all the while the statesmen are at work to divert and obstruct the
working forces of this industrial system, here and there, for the special
advantage of one nation and another at the cost of the rest; and the captains
of finance are working, at cross purposes and in collusion, to divert whatever
they can to the special gain of one vested interest and another, at any cost to
the rest. So it happens that the industrial system is deliberately handicapped
with dissension, misdirection, and unemployment of material resources,
equipment, and man power, at every turn where the statesmen or the
captains of finance can touch its mechanism; and all the civilized peoples are
suffering privation together because their general staff of industrial experts
are in this way required to take orders a'nd submit to sabotage at the hands
of the statesmen and the vested interests. Politics and investment are still
allowed to decide matters of industrial policy which should plainly be left to
the discretion of the general staff of production engineers driven by no
commercial bias.
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tribulations will seem overdrawn. However, it is not intended to apply to
any date earlier than the twentieth century, or to any backward community
that still lies outside the sweep of the mechanical industry. Only gradually
during the past century, while the mechanical industry has progressively
been taking over the production of goods and services, and going over to
quantity production, has the industrial system taken on this character of an
inclusive organization of interlocking processes and interchange of materials;
and it is only in the twentieth century that this cumulative progression has
come to a head with such effect that this characterization is now visibly
becoming true. And even now it will hold true, visibly and securely, only as
applies to the leading mechanical industries, those main lines of industry that
shape the main conditions of life, and in which quantity production has
become the common and indispensable rule. Such are, e.g., transport and
communication; the production and industrial use of coal, oil, electricity and
water power; the production of steel and other metals; of wood pulp, lumber,
cement and other building materials; of textiles and rubber; as also grain-
milling and much of the grain-growing, together with meat-packing and a
good share of the stock-raising industry.
There is, of course, a large volume of industry in many lines which has not,
or only in part and doubtfully, been drawn into this network of mechanical
processes and quantity production, in any direct and conclusive fashion. But
these other lines of industry that still stand over on another and older plan
of operation are, after all, outliers and subsidiaries of the mechanically
organized industrial system, dependent on or subservient to those greater
underlying industries which make up the working body of the system, and
which therefore set the pace for the rest. And in the main, therefore, and as
regards these greater mechanical industries on whose due working the
material welfare of the community depends from day to day, this character-
ization will apply without material abatement.
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underlying, lines of production the system has not yet reached a fatal degree
of close-knit interdependence, balance, and complication; it will still run
along at a very tolerable efficiency in the face of a very appreciable amount
of persistent derangement. That is to say, the industrial system at large has
not yet become so delicately balanced a mechanical structure and process
that the ordinary amount of derangement and sabotage necessary to the
ordinary control of production by business methods will paralyze the whole
outright. The industrial system is not yet sufficiently close-knit for that. And
yet, that extent and degree of paralysis from which the civilized world's
industry is suffering just now, due to legitimate businesslike sabotage, goes
to argue that the date may not be far distant when the interlocking processes
of the industrial system shall have become so closely interdependent and so
delicately balanced that even the ordinary modicum of sabotage involved in
the conduct of business as usual will bring the whole to a fatal collapse. The
derangement and privation brought on by any well organized strike of the
larger sort argues to the same effect.
In effect, the progressive advance of this industrial system towards an all-
inclusive mechanical balance of interlocking processes appears to be
approaching a critical pass, beyond which it will no longer be practicable to
leave its control in the hands of business men working at cross purposes for
private gain, or to entrust its continued administration to others than suitably
trained technological experts, production engineers without a commercial
interest. What these men may then do with it all is not so plain; the best they
can do may not be good enough; but the negative proposition is becoming
sufficiently plain, that this mechanical state of the industrial arts will not long
tolerate the continued control of production by the vested interests under the
current businesslike rule of incapacity by advisement.
In the beginning, that is to say during the early growth of the machine
industry, and particularly in that new growth of mechanical industries which
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between the industrial experts and the business managers. That was before
the new industrial system had gone far on the road of progressive specializa-
tion and complexity, and before business had reached an exactingly large
scale; so that even the business men of that time, who were without special
training in technological matters, would still be able to exercise something of
an intelligent oversight of the whole, and to understand something of what
was required in the mechanical conduct of the work which they financed and
from which they drew their income. Not unusually the designers of
industrial processes and equipment would then still take care of the financial
end, at the same time that they managed the shop. But from an early point
in the development there set in a progressive differentiation, such as to
divide those who designed and administered the industrial processes from
those others who designed and managed the commercial transactions and
took care of the financial end. So there also set in a corresponding division
of powers between the business management and the technological experts.
It became the work of the technologist to determine, on technological
grounds, what could be done in the way of productive industry, and to
contrive ways and means of doing it; but the business management always
continued to decide, on commercial grounds, how much work should be
done and what kind and quality of goods and services should be produced;
and the decision of the business management has always continued to be
final, and has always set the limit beyond which production must not go.
With the continued growth of specialization the experts have necessarily
had more and more to say in the affairs of industry; but always their findings
as to what work is to be done and what ways and means are to be employed
in production have had to wait on the findings of the business managers as
to what will be expedient for the purpose of commercial gain. This division
between business management and industrial management has continued
to go forward, at a continually accelerated rate, because the special training
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of these industrial processes has continually grown more exacting, calling for
special knowledge and abilities on the part of those who have this work to
do and requiring their undivided interest and their undivided attention to
the work in hand. But these specialists in technological knowledge, abilities,
interest, and experience, who have increasingly come into the case in this
way — inventors, designers, chemists, mineralogists, soil experts, crop
specialists, production managers and engineers of many kinds and denomi-
nations — have continued to be employees of the captains of industry, that
is to say, of the captains of finance, whose work it has been to commercialize
the knowledge and abilities of the industrial experts and turn them to
account for their own gain.
It is perhaps unnecessary to add the axiomatic corollary that the captains
have always turned the technologists and their knowledge to account in this
way only so far as would serve their own commercial profit, not to the extent
of their ability; or to the limit set by the material circumstances; or by the
needs of the community. The result has been, uniformly and as a matter of
course, that the production of goods and services has advisedly been stopped
short of productive capacity, by curtailment of output and by derangement
of the productive system. There are two main reasons for this, and both have
operated together throughout the machine era to stop industrial production
increasingly short of productive capacity, (a) The commercial need of
maintaining a profitable price has led to an increasingly imperative
curtailment of the output, as fast as the advance of the industrial arts has
enhanced the productive capacity. And (b) the continued advance of the
mechanical technology has called for an ever-increasing volume and
diversity of special knowledge, and so has left the businesslike captains of
finance continually farther in arrears, so that they have been less and less
capable of comprehending what is required in the ordinary way of industrial
equipment and personnel. They have therefore, in effect, maintained prices
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production-cost per unit of output, because they have not had such a
working acquaintance with the technological facts in the case as would
enable them to form a passably sound judgment of suitable ways and means
for lowering production-cost ; and at the same time, being shrewd business
men, they have been unable to rely on the hired-man's-loyalty of technolo-
gists whom they do not understand. The result has been a somewhat
distrustful blindfold choice of processes and personnel and a consequent
enforced incompetence in the management of industry, a curtailment of
output below the needs of the community, below the productive capacity of
the industrial system, and below what an intelligent control of production
would have made commercially profitable.
Through the earlier decades of the machine era these limitations imposed
on the work of the experts by the demands of profitable business and by the
technical ignorance of the business men, appears not to have been a heavy
handicap, whether as a hindrance to the continued development of
technological knowledge or as an obstacle to its ordinary use in industry.
That was before the mechanical industry had gone far in scope, complexity,
and specialization; and it was also before the continued work of the
technologists had pushed the industrial system to so high a productive
capacity that it is forever in danger of turning out a larger product than is
required for a profitable business. But gradually, with the passage of time
and the advance of the industrial arts to a wider scope and a larger scale, and
to an increasing specialization and standardization of processes, the
technological knowledge that makes up the state of the industrial arts has
called for a higher degree of that training that makes industrial specialists;
and at the same time any passably efficient management of industry has of
necessity drawn on them and their special abilities to an ever-increasing
extent. At the same time and by the same shift of circumstances, the captains
of finance, driven by an increasingly close application to the affairs of
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productive industry; and, it is to be admitted, they have also continued
increasingly to distrust the technological specialists, whom they do not
understand, but whom they can also not get along without. The captains
have per force continued to employ the technologists, to make money for
them, but they have done so only reluctantly, tardily, sparingly, and with a
shrewd circumspection; only because and so far as they have been persuaded
that the use of these technologists was indispensable to the making of money.
One outcome of this persistent and pervasive tardiness and circumspection
on the part of the captains has been an incredibly and increasingly uneco-
nomical use of material resources, and an incredibly wasteful organization
of equipment and man power in those great industries where the technologi-
cal advance has been most marked. In good part it was this discreditable
pass, to which the leading industries had been brought by these one-eyed
captains of industry, that brought the regime of the captains to an inglorious
close, by shifting the initiative and discretion in this domain out of their
hands into those of the investment bankers. By custom the investment
bankers had occupied a position between or overlapping the duties of a
broker in corporate securities and those of an underwriter of corporate
flotations — such a position, in effect, as is still assigned them in the standard
writings on corporation finance. The increasingly large scale of corporate
enterprise, as well as the growth of a mutual understanding among these
business concerns, also had its share in this new move. But about this time,
too, the “consulting engineers” were coming notably into evidence in many
of those lines of industry in which corporation finance has habitually been
concerned.
So far as concerns the present argument the ordinary duties of these
consulting engineers have been to advise the investment bankers as to the
industrial and commercial soundness, past and prospective, of any enterprise
that is to be underwritten. These duties have comprised a painstaking and
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as well as an equally impartial auditing of the accounts and appraisal of the
commercial promise of such enterprises, for the guidance of the bankers or
syndicate of bankers interested in the case as underwriters. On this ground
working arrangements and a mutual understanding presently arose between
the consulting engineers and those banking houses that habitually were
concerned in the underwriting of corporate enterprises.
The effect of this move has been twofold: experience has brought out the
fact that corporation finance, at its best and soundest, has now become a
matter of comprehensive and standardized bureaucratic routine, necessarily
comprising the mutual relations between various corporate concerns, and
best to be taken care of by a clerical staff of trained accountants; and the same
experience has put the financial houses in direct touch with the technological
general staff of the industrial system, whose surveillance has become
increasingly imperative to the conduct of any profitable enterprise in
industry. But also, by the same token, it has appeared that the corporation
financier of nineteenth-century tradition is no longer of the essence of the
case in corporation finance of the larger and more responsible sort. He has,
in effect, come to be no better than an idle wheel in the economic mechanism,
serving only to take up some of the lubricant.
Since and so far as this shift out of the nineteenth century into the twentieth
has been completed, the corporation financier has ceased to be a captain of
industry and has become a lieutenant of finance; the captaincy having been
taken over by the syndicated investment bankers and administered as a
standardized routine of accountancy, having to do with the flotation of
corporation securities and with their fluctuating values, and having also
something to do with regulating the rate and volume of output in those
industrial enterprises which so have passed under the hand of the invest-
ment bankers.
By and large, such is the situation of the industrial system today, and of that
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is not so much an accomplished fact handed on out of the recent past; it is
only that such is the culmination in which it all heads up in the immediate
present, and that such is the visible drift of things into the calculable future.
Only during the last few years has the state of affairs in industry been
obviously falling into the shape so outlined, and it is even yet only in those
larger and pace-making lines of industry which are altogether of the new
technological order that the state of things has reached this finished shape.
But in these larger and underlying divisions of the industrial system the
present posture and drift of things is unmistakable. Meantime very much still
stands over out of that regime of rule-of-thumb, competitive sabotage, and
commercial logrolling, in which the businesslike captains of the old order are
so altogether well at home, and which has been the best that the captains
have known how to contrive for the management of that industrial system
whose captains they have been. So that wherever the production experts are
now taking over the management, out of the dead hand of the self-made
captains, and wherever they have occasions to inquire into the established
conditions of production, they find the ground cumbered with all sorts of
incredible makeshifts of waste and inefficiency — such makeshifts as would
perhaps pass muster with any moderately stupid elderly layman, but which
look like blindfold guesswork to these men who know something of the
advanced technology and its working-out.
Hitherto, then, the growth and conduct of this industrial system presents
this singular outcome. The technology — the state of the industrial-arts —
which takes effect in this mechanical industry is in an eminent sense a joint
stock of knowledge and experience held in common by the civilized peoples.
It requires the use of trained and instructed workmen — born, bred, trained,
and instructed at the cost of the people at large. So also it requires, with a
continually more exacting insistence, a corps of highly trained and specially
gifted experts, of divers and various kinds. These, too, are born, bred, and
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special knowledge from the community's joint stock of accumulated
experience. These expert men, technologists, engineers, or whatever name
may best suit them, make up the indispensable General Staff of the industrial
system; and without their immediate and unremitting guidance and
correction the industrial system will not work. It is a mechanically organized
structure of technical processes designed, installed, and conducted by these
production engineers. Without them and their constant attention the
industrial equipment, the mechanical appliances of industry, will foot up to
just so much junk. The material welfare of the community is unreservedly
bound up with the due working of this industrial system, and therefore with
its unreserved control by the engineers, who alone are competent to manage
it. To do their work as it should be done these men of the industrial general
staff must have a free hand, unhampered by commercial considerations and
reservations; for the production of the goods and services needed by the
community they neither need nor are they in any degree benefited by any
supervision or interference from the side of the owners. Yet the absentee
owners, now represented, in effect, by the syndicated investment bankers,
continue to control the industrial experts and limit their discretion, arbi-
trarily, for their own commercial gain, regardless of the needs of the
community.
Hitherto these men who so make up the general staff of the industrial
system have not drawn together into anything like a self-directing working
force; nor have they been vested with anything more than an occasional,
haphazard, and tentative control of some disjointed sector of the industrial
equipment, with no direct or decisive relation to that personnel of productive
industry that may be called the officers of the line and the rank and file. It is
still the unbroken privilege of the financial management and its financial
agents to “hire and fire.” The final disposition of all the industrial forces still
remains in the hands of the business men, who still continue to dispose of
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secret that with a reasonably free hand the production experts would today
readily increase the ordinary output of industry by several fold, — variously
estimated at some 300 per cent, to 1200 per cent, of the current output. And
what stands in the way of so increasing the ordinary output of goods and
services is business as usual.
Right lately these technologists have begun to become uneasily “class-
conscious” and to reflect that they together constitute the indispensable
General Staff of the industrial system. Their class consciousness has taken the
immediate form of a growing sense of waste and confusion in the manage-
ment of industry by the financial agents of the absentee owners. They are
beginning to take stock of that all-pervading mismanagement of industry
that is inseparable from its control for commercial ends. All of which brings
home a realization of their own shame and of damage to the common good.
So the engineers are beginning to draw together and ask themselves, “What
about it?”
This uneasy movement among the technologists set in, in an undefined and
fortuitous way, in the closing years of the nineteenth century; when the
consulting engineers, and then presently the “efficiency engineers,” began to
make scattered corrections in detail, which showed up the industrial
incompetence of those elderly laymen who were doing a conservative
business at the cost of industry. The consulting engineers of the standard
type, both then and since then, are commercialized technologists, whose
work it is to appraise the industrial value of any given enterprise with a view
to its commercial exploitation. They are a cross between a technological
specialist and a commercial agent, beset with the limitations of both and
commonly not fully competent in either line. Their normal position is that of
an employee of the investment bankers, on a stipend or a retainer, and it has
ordinarily been their fortune to shift over in time from a technological footing
to a frankly commercial one. The case of the efficiency engineers, or
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to appraise, exhibit, and correct the commercial short-comings of the
ordinary management of those industrial establishments which they
investigate, to persuade the business men in charge how they may reason-
ably come in for larger net earnings by a more closely shorn exploitation of
the industrial forces at their disposal. During the opening years of the new
century a lively interest centered on the views and expositions of these two
groups of industrial experts; and not least was the interest aroused by their
exhibits of current facts indicating an all-pervading lag, leak, and friction in
the industrial system, due to its disjointed and one-eyed management by
commercial adventurers bent on private gain.
During these few years of the opening century the members of this informal
guild of engineers at large have been taking an interest in this question of
habitual mismanagement by ignorance and commercial sabotage, even apart
from the commercial imbecility of it all. But it is the young rather than the old
among them who see industry in any other light than its commercial value.
Circumstances have decided that the older generation of the craft have
become pretty well commercialized. Their habitual outlook has been shaped
by a long and unbroken apprenticeship to the corporation financiers and the
investment bankers; so that they still habitually see the industrial system as
a contrivance for the roundabout process of making money. Accordingly, the
established official Associations and Institutes of Engineers, which are
officered and engineered by the elder engineers, old and young, also
continue to show the commercial bias of their creators, in what they criticize
and in what they propose. But the new generation which has been coming
on during the present century are not similarly true to that tradition of
commercial engineering that makes the technological man an awestruck
lieutenant of the captain of finance.
By training, and perhaps also by native bent, the technologists find it easy
and convincing to size up men and things in terms of tangible performance,
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captains of finance may have made commercial afterthought a second nature
to them. Many of the younger generation are beginning to understand that
engineering begins and ends in the domain of tangible performance, and that
commercial expediency is another matter. Indeed, they are beginning to
understand that commercial expediency has nothing better to contribute to
the engineer's work than so much lag, leak, and friction. The four years'
experience of the war has also been highly instructive on that head. So they
are beginning to draw together on a common ground of understanding, as
men who are concerned with the ways and means of tangible performance
in the way of productive industry, according to the state of the industrial arts
as they know them at their best; and there is a growing conviction among
them that they together constitute the sufficient and indispensable general
staff of the mechanical industries, on whose unhindered team-work depends
the due working of the industrial system and therefore also the material
welfare of the civilized peoples. So also, to these men who are trained in the
stubborn logic of technology, nothing is quite real that cannot be stated in
terms of tangible performance; and they are accordingly coming to under-
stand that the whole fabric of credit and corporation finance is a tissue of
make-believe.
Credit obligations and financial transactions rest on certain principles of
legal formality which have been handed down from the eighteenth century,
and which therefore antedate the mechanical industry and carry no secure
conviction to men trained in the logic of that industry. Within this technologi-
cal system of tangible performance corporation finance and all its works and
gestures are completely idle; it all comes into the working scheme of the
engineers only as a gratuitous intrusion which could be barred out without
deranging the work at any point, provided only that men made up their
mind to that effect — that is to say, provided the make-believe of absentee
ownership were discontinued. Its only obvious effect on the work which the
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work. So the next question which the engineers are due to ask regarding this
timeworn fabric of ownership, finance, sabotage, credit, and unearned
income is likely to be: Why cumbers it the ground? And they are likely to
find the scriptural answer ready to their hand.
It would be hazardous to surmise how, how soon, on what provocation,
and with what effect the guild of engineers are due to realize that they
constitute a guild, and that the material fortunes of the civilized peoples
already lie loose in their hands. But it is already sufficiently plain that the
industrial conditions and the drift of conviction among the engineers are
drawing together to some such end.
Hitherto it has been usual to count on the interested negotiations continu-
ally carried on and never concluded between capital and labor, between the
agents of the investors and the body of workmen, to bring about whatever
readjustments are to be looked for in the control of productive industry and
in the distribution and use of its product. These negotiations have necessarily
been, and continue to be, in the nature of business transactions, bargaining
for a price, since both parties to the negotiation continue to stand on the
consecrated ground of ownership, free bargain, and self-help; such as the
commercial wisdom of the eighteenth century saw, approved and certified
it all, in the time before the coming of this perplexing industrial system. In
the course of these endless negotiations between the owners and their
workmen there has been some loose and provisional syndication of claims
and forces on both sides; so that each of these two recognized parties to the
industrial controversy has come to make up a loose-knit vested interest, and
each speaks for its own special claims as a party in interest. Each is contend-
ing for some special gain for itself and trying to drive a profitable bargain for
itself, and hitherto no disinterested spokesman for the community at large
or for the industrial system as a going concern has seriously cut into this
controversy between these contending vested interests. The outcome has
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sale. It is true, during the war, and for the conduct of the war, there were
some half-concerted measures taken by the Administration in the interest of
the nation at large, as a belligerent; but it has always been tacitly agreed that
these were extraordinary war measures, not to be countenanced in time of
peace. In time of peace the accepted rule is still business as usual; that is to
say, investors and workmen wrangling together on a footing of business as
usual.
These negotiations have necessarily been inconclusive. So long as owner-
ship of resources and industrial plant is allowed, or so long as it is allowed
any degree of control or consideration in the conduct of industry, nothing
more substantial can come of any readjustment than a concessive mitigation
of the owners' interference with production. There is accordingly nothing
subversive in these bouts of bargaining between the federated workmen and
the syndicated owners. It is a game of chance and skill played between two
contending vested interests for private gain, in which the industrial system
as a going concern enters only as a victim of interested interference. Yet the
material welfare of the community, and not least of the workmen, turns on
the due working of this industrial system, without interference. Concessive
mitigation of the right to interfere with production, on the part of either one
of these vested interests, can evidently come to nothing more substantial than
a concessive mitigation.
But owing to the peculiar technological character of this industrial system,
with its specialized, standardized, mechanical, and highly technical
interlocking processes of production, there has gradually come into being
this corps of technological production specialists, into whose keeping the due
functioning of the industrial system has now drifted by force of circum-
stance. They are, by force of circumstance, the keepers of the community's
material welfare; although they have hitherto been acting, in effect, as
keepers and providers of free income for the kept classes. They are thrown
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same move they are in a position to become arbiters of the community's
material welfare. They are becoming class-conscious, and they are no longer
driven by a commercial interest, in any such degree as will make them a
vested interest in that commercial sense in which the syndicated owners and
the federated workmen are vested interests. They are, at the same time,
numerically and by habitual outlook, no such heterogeneous and unwieldy
body as the federated workmen, whose numbers and scattering interest has
left all their endeavors substantially nugatory. In short, the engineers are in
a position to make the next move.
By comparison with the population at large, including the financial powers
and the kept classes, the technological specialists which come in question
here are a very inconsiderable number; yet this small number is indispens-
able to the continued working of the productive industries. So slight are their
numbers, and so sharply defined and homogeneous is their class, that a
sufficiently compact and inclusive organization of their forces should arrange
itself almost as a matter of course, so soon as any appreciable proportion of
them shall be moved by any common purpose. And the common purpose is
not far to seek, in the all-pervading industrial confusion, obstruction, waste,
and retardation which business as usual continually throws in their face. At
the same time they are the leaders of the industrial personnel, the workmen,
of the officers of the line and the rank and file; and these are coming into a
frame of mind to follow their leaders in any adventure that holds a promise
of advancing the common good.
To these men, soberly trained in a spirit of tangible performance and
endowed with something more than an even share of the sense of workman-
ship, and endowed also with the common heritage of partiality for the rule
of Live and Let Live, the disallowance of an outworn and obstructive right
of absentee ownership is not likely to seem a shocking infraction of the
sacred realties. That customary right of ownership by virtue of which the
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kept classes, belongs to an older order of things than the mechanical
industry. It has come out of a past that was made up of small things and
traditional make-believe. For all the purposes of that scheme of tangible
performance that goes to make up the technologist's world, it is without form
and void. So that, given time for due irritation, it should by no means come
as a surprise if the guild of engineers are provoked to put their heads
together and, quite out of hand, disallow that large absentee ownership that
goes to make the vested interests and to unmake the industrial system. And
there stand behind them the massed and rough-handed legions of the
industrial rank and file, ill at ease and looking for new things. The older
commercialized generation among them would, of course, ask themselves:
Why should we worry ? What do we stand to gain ? But the younger
generation, not so hard-bitten by commercial experience, will be quite as
likely to ask themselves: What do we stand to lose? And there is the patent
fact that such a thing as a general strike of the technological specialists in
industry need involve no more than a minute fraction of one per cent, of the
population; yet it would swiftly bring a collapse of the old order and sweep
the timeworn fabric of finance and absentee sabotage into the discard for
good and all, Such a catastrophe would doubtless be deplorable. It would
look something like the end of the world to all those persons who take their
stand with the kept classes, but it may come to seem no more than an
incident of the day's work to the engineers and to the rough-handed legions
of the rank and file. It is a situation which may well be deplored. But there
is no gain in losing patience with a conjunction of circumstances. And it can
do no harm to take stock of the situation and recognize that, by force of
circumstance, it is now open to the Council of Technological Workers' and
Soldiers' Deputies to make the next move, in their own way and in their own
good time. When and what this move will be, if any, or even what it will be
like, is not something on which a layman can hold a confident opinion. But
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is now held on sufferance of the engineers and is liable at any time to be




Bolshevism is a menace to the vested rights of property and privilege.
Therefore the guardians of the Vested Interests have been thrown into a state
of Red trepidation by the continued functioning of Soviet Russia and the
continual outbreaks of the same Red distemper elsewhere on the continent
of Europe. It is feared, with a nerve-shattering fear, that the same Red
distemper of Bolshevism must presently infect the underlying population in
America and bring on an overturn of the established order, so soon as the
underlying population are in a position to take stock of the situation and
make up their mind to a course of action. The situation is an uneasy one, and
it contains the elements of much trouble; at least such appears to be the
conviction of the Guardians of the established order. Something of the kind
is felt to be due, on the grounds of the accomplished facts. So it is feared,
with a nerve-shattering fear, that anything like uncolored information as to
the facts in the case and anything like a free popular discussion of these facts
must logically result in disaster. Hence all this unseemly trepidation.
The Guardians of the Vested Interests, official and quasi-official, have
allowed their own knowledge of this sinister state of things to unseat their
common sense. The run of the facts has jostled them out of the ruts, and they
have gone in for a headlong policy of clamor and repression, to cover and
suppress matters of fact and to shut off discussion and deliberation. And all
the while the Guardians are also feverishly at work on a mobilization of such
forces as may hopefully be counted on to “keep the situation in hand” in case
the expected should happen. The one manifestly conclusive resolution to
which the Guardians of the Vested Interests have come is that the underlying
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settled principle of conduct appears to be, to stick at nothing; in all of which,
doubtless, the Guardians mean well.
Now, the Guardians of the Vested Interests are presumably wise in
discountenancing any open discussion or any free communication of ideas
and opinions. It could lead to nothing more comfortable than popular
irritation and distrust. The Vested Interests are known to have been actively
concerned in the prosecution of the War, and there is no lack of evidence that
their spokesmen have been heard in the subsequent counsels of the Peace.
And, no doubt, the less that is known and said about the doings of the Vested
Interests during the War and after, the better both for the public tranquility
and for the continued growth and profit of the Vested Interests. Yet it is not
to be overlooked that facts of such magnitude and of such urgent public
concern as the manoeuvres of the Vested Interests during the War and after
can not be altogether happily covered over with a conspiracy of silence.
Something like a middle course of temperate publicity should have seemed
more to the point. It may be unfortunate, but it is none the less unavoidable,
that something appreciable is bound to come to light; that is to say,
something sinister.
It should be plain to all good citizens who have the cause of law and order
at heart that in such a case a more genial policy of conciliatory promises and
procrastination will be more to the purpose than any noisy recourse to the
strong arm and the Star Chamber. A touch of history, and more particularly
of contemporary history, would have given the Guardians a touch of sanity.
Grown wise in all the ways and means of blamelessly defeating the unblest
majority, the gentlemanly government of the British manage affairs of this
kind much better. They have learned that bellicose gestures provoke ill will,
and that desperate remedies should be held in reserve until needed. Whereas
the Guardians of the Vested Interests in America are plainly putting things
in train for a capial operation, for which there is no apparent necessity. It
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fateful stage where nothing short of a capital operation can be counted on to
save the life of the Vested Interests in America; not yet. And indeed, things
need assuredly not reach such a stage if reasonable measures are taken to
avoid undue alarm and irritation. All that is needed to keep the underlying
population of America in a sweet temper is a degree of patient ambiguity
and delay, something after the British pattern; and all will yet be well with
the vested rights of property and privilege, for some time to come.
History teaches that no effectual popular uprising can be set afoot against
an outworn institutional iniquity unless the movement effectually meets the
special material requirements of the situation which provokes it; nor on the
other hand can an impending popular overturn be staved off without making
up one's account with those material conditions which converge to bring it
on. The long history of British gentlemanly compromise, collusion, concilia-
tion, and popular defeat, is highly instructive on that head. And it should be
evident to any disinterested person, on any slight survey of the pertinent
facts, that the situation in America does not now offer such a combination of
circumstances as would be required for any effectual overturn of the
established order or any forcible dispossession of these Vested Interests that
now control the material fortunes of the American people. In short, by force
of circumstances, Bolshevism is not a present menace to the Vested Interests
in America; provided always that the Guardians of these Vested Interests do
not go out of their way to precipitate trouble by such measures as will make
Bolshevism of any complexion seem the lesser evil, — which is perhaps not
a safe proviso, in view of the hysterically Red state of mind of the Guardians.
No movement for the dispossession of the Vested Interests in America can
hope for even a temporary success unless it is undertaken by an organization
which is competent to take over the country's productive industry as a
whole, and to administer it from the start on a more efficient plan than that
now pursued by the Vested Interests ; and there is no such organization in
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organization of industrial forces in America, just yet, is the A. F. of L.; which
need only be named in order to dispel the illusion that there is anything to
hope or fear in the way of a radical move at its hands. The A. F. of L. is itself
one of the Vested Interests, as ready as any other to do battle for its own
margin of privilege and profit. At the same time it would be a wholly
chimerical fancy to believe that such an organization of workmen as the A.
F. of L. could take over and manage any appreciable section of the industrial
system, even if their single-minded interest in special privileges for
themselves did not preclude their making a move in that direction. The
Federation is not organized for production but for bargaining. It is not
organized on lines that would be workable for the management of any
industrial system as a whole, or of any special line of production within such
a system. It is, in effect, an organization for the strategic defeat of employers
and rival organizations, by recourse to enforced unemployment and
obstruction; not for the production of goods and services. And it is officered
by tacticians, skilled in the ways and means of bargaining with politicians
and intimidating employers and employees; not by men who have any
special insight into or interest in the ways and means of quantity production
and traffic management. They are not, and for their purpose they need not
be, technicians in any conclusive sense,— and the fact should not be lost sight
of that any effectual overturn, of the kind hazily contemplated by the
hysterical officials, will always have to be primarily a technical affair.
In effect, the Federation is officered by safe and sane politicians, and its
rank and file are votaries of “the full dinner-pail.” No Guardian need worry
about the Federation, and there is no other organization in sight which
differs materially from the Federation in those respects which would count
toward a practical move in the direction of a popular overturn,— unless a
doubtful exception should be claimed for the Railroad Brotherhoods. The A.
F. of L. is a business organization with a vested interest of its own; for
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of management by the other Vested Interests; not for managing productive
industry or even for increasing the output of goods produced under any
management. At the best, its purpose and ordinary business is to gain a little
something for its own members at a more than proportionate cost to the rest
of the community; which does not afford either the spiritual or the material
ground for a popular overturn.
Nor is it the A. F. of L. or the other organizations for “collective bargaining
“ that come in for the comfortless attentions of the officials and of the many
semi-official conspiracies in restraint of sobriety. Their nerve-shattering fears
center rather on those irresponsible wayfaring men of industry who make up
the I. W. W., and on the helpless and hapless alien unbelievers whose
contribution to the sum total is loose talk in some foreign tongue. But if there
is any assertion to be made without fear of stumbling it will be, that this
flotsam of industry is not organized to take over the highly technical duties
involved in the administration of the industrial system. But it is these and
their like that engage the best attention of the many commissions, commit-
tees, clubs, leagues, federations, syndicates, and corporations for the chasing
of wild geese under the Red flag.
Wherever the mechanical industry has taken decisive effect, as in America
and in the two or three industrialized regions of Europe, the community lives
from hand to mouth in such a way that its livelihood depends on the
effectual working of its industrial system from day to day. In such a case a
serious disturbance and derangement of the balanced process of production
is always easily brought on, and it always brings immediate hardship on
large sections of the community. Indeed, it is this state of things — the ease
with which industry can be deranged and hardship can be brought to bear
on the people at large — that constitutes the chief asset of such partisan
organizations as the A. F. of L. It is a state of things which makes sabotage
easy and effectual and gives it breadth and scope. But sabotage is not
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and the U. S. Senate would be counted among the revolutionists.
Far-reaching sabotage, that is to say derangement of the industrial system,
such as to entail hardship on the community at large or on some particular
section of it, is easily brought to bear in any country that is dominated by the
mechanical industry. It is commonly resorted to by both parties in any
controversy between the businesslike employers and the employees. It is, in
fact, an everyday expedient of business, and no serious blame attaches to its
ordinary use. Under given circumstances, as, e.g., under the circumstances
just now created by the return of peace, such derangement of industry and
hindrance of production is an unavoidable expedient of “business as usual.”
And derangement of the same nature is also commonly resorted to as a
means of coercion in any attempted movement of overturn. It is the simple
and obvious means of initiating any revolutionary disturbance in any
industrial or commercialized country. But under the existing industrial
conditions, if it is to achieve even a transient success, any such revolutionary
movement of reconstruction must also be in a position from the outset to
overcome any degree of initial derangement in industry, whether of its own
making or not, and to do constructive work of that particular kind which is
called for by the present disposition of industrial forces and by the present
close dependence of the community's livelihood on the due systematic
working of these industrial forces. To take effect and to hold its own even for
the time being, any movement of overturn must from beforehand provide for
a sufficiently productive conduct of the industrial system on which the
community's material welfare depends, and for a competent distribution of
goods and services throughout the community. Otherwise, under existing
industrial conditions, nothing more can be accomplished than an ephemeral
disturbance and a transient season of accentuated hardship. Even a transient
failure to make good in the management of the industrial system must
immediately defeat any movement of overturn in any of the advanced
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present industrial system and the manner of close-knit community life
enforced by this industrial system have no example in history.
This state of things, which so conditions the possibility of any revolutionary
overturn, is peculiar to the advanced industrial countries; and the limitations
which this state of things imposes are binding within these countries in the
same measure in which these peoples are dominated by the system of
mechanical industry. In contrast with this state of things, the case of Soviet
Russia may be cited to show the difference. As compared with America and
much of western Europe, Russia is not an industrialized region, in any
decisive sense; although Russia, too, leans on the mechanical industry in a
greater degree than is commonly recognized. Indeed, so considerable is the
dependence of the Russians on the mechanical industry that it may yet prove
to be the decisive factor in the struggle which is now going on between
Soviet Russia and the Allied Powers.
Now, it is doubtless this continued success of the Soviet administration in
Russia that has thrown this ecstatic scare into the Guardians of the Vested
Interests in America and in the civilized countries of Europe. There is
nothing to be gained by denying that the Russian Soviet has achieved a
measure of success; indeed, an astonishing measure of success, considering
the extremely adverse circumstances under which the Soviet has been at
work. The fact may be deplored, but there it is. The Soviet has plainly been
successful, in the material respect, far beyond the reports which have been
allowed to pass the scrutiny of the Seven Censors and the Associated
Prevarication Bureaux of the Allied Powers. And this continued success of
Bolshevism in Russia — or such measure of success as it has achieved — is
doubtless good ground for a reasonable degree of apprehension among good
citizens elsewhere; but it does not by any means argue that anything like the
same measure of success could be achieved by a revolutionary movement on
the same lines in America, even in the absence of intervention from outside.
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great odds for some two years; and it is even yet a point in doubt whether the
Allied Powers will be able to put down the Soviet by use of all the forces at
their disposal and with the help of all the reactionary elements in Russia and
in the neighboring countries. But the Soviet owes this measure of success to
the fact that the Russian people have not yet been industrialized in anything
like the same degree as their western neighbors. They have in great measure
been able to fall back on an earlier, simpler, less close-knit plan of productive
industry; such that any detailed part of this loose-knit Russian community
is able, at a pinch, to draw its own livelihood from its own soil by its own
work, without that instant and unremitting dependence on materials and
wrought goods drawn from foreign ports and distant regions, that is
characteristic of the advanced industrial peoples. This old-fashioned plan of
home production does not involve an “industrial system” in the same
exacting sense as the mechanical industry. The Russian industrial system, it
is true, also runs on something of a balanced plan of give and take; it leans
on the mechanical industry in some considerable degree and draws on
foreign trade for many of its necessary articles of use; but for the transient
time being, and for an appreciable interval of time, such a home-bred
industrious population, living close to the soil and supplying its ordinary
needs by home-bred handicraft methods, will be able to maintain itself in a
fair state of efficiency if not in comfort, even in virtual isolation from the
more advanced industrial centers and from the remoter sources of raw
materials. To the ignorant,— that is to say, to the wiseacres of commerce,—
this ability of the Russian people to continue alive and active under the
conditions of an exemplary blockade has been a source of incredulous
astonishment.
It is only as a fighting power, and then only for the purposes of an
aggressive war, that such a community can count for virtually nothing in a
contest with the advanced industrial nations. Such a people makes an
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supporting, in a loose and comfortless way, and in this sense it is a very
defensible country and may yet prove extremely difficult for the Allied
Powers to subdue; but in the nature of the case there need be not the slightest
shadow of apprehension that Soviet Russia can successfully take the
offensive against any outside people, great or small, which has the use of the
advanced mechanical industry.
The statesmen of the Allied Powers, who are now carrying on a covert war
against Soviet Russia, are in a position to know this state of the case; and not
least those American statesmen, who have by popular sentiment been
constrained reluctantly to limit and mask their cooperation with the
reactionary forces in Finland, Poland, the Ukraine, Siberia, and elsewhere.
They have all been at pains diligently to inquire into the state of things in
Soviet Russia; although, it is true, they have also been at pains to give out
surprisingly little information,— that being much of the reason for the Seven
Censors. The well-published official and semi-official apprehension of a
Bolshevist offensive to be carried on beyond the Soviet frontiers may quite
safely be set down as an article of statesmanlike subterfuge. The statesmen
know better. What is feared in fact is infection of the Bolshevist spirit beyond
the Soviet frontiers, to the detriment of those Vested Interests whose
guardians these statesmen are.
And on this head the apprehensions of these Elder Statesmen are not
altogether groundless; for the Elder Statesmen are also in a position to know,
without much inquiry, that there is no single spot or corner in civilized
Europe or America where the underlying population would have anything
to lose by such an overturn of the established order as would cancel the
vested rights of privilege and property, whose guardians they are. But
commercialized America is not the same thing as Soviet Russia. By and large,
America is an advanced industrial country, bound in the web of a fairly
close-knit and inclusive industrial system. The industrial situation, and
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countries in those respects that would make the outcome in any effectual
revolt. So that, for better or worse, the main lines that would necessarily have
to be followed in working out any practicable revolutionary movement in
this country are already laid down by the material conditions of its produc-
tive industry. On provocation there might come a flare of riotous disorder;
but it would come to nothing, however substantial the provocation might be,
so long as the movement does not fall in with those main lines of manage-
ment which the state of the industrial system requires in order to insure any
sustained success. These main lines of revolutionary strategy are lines of
technical organization and industrial management; essentially lines of
industrial engineering; such as will fit the organization to take care of the
highly technical industrial system that constitutes the indispensable material
foundation of any modern civilized community. They will accordingly not
only be of a profoundly different order from what may do well enough in the
case of such a loose-knit and backward industrial region as Russia, but they
will necessarily also be of a kind which has no close parallel in the past
history of revolutionary movements. Revolutions in the eighteenth century
were military and political; and the Elder Statesmen who now believe
themselves to be making history still believe that revolutions can be made
and unmade by the same ways and means in the twentieth century. But any
substantial or effectual overturn in the twentieth century will necessarily be
an industrial overturn; and by the same token, any twentieth-century
revolution can be combated or neutralized only by industrial ways and
means. The case of America, therefore, considered as a candidate for
Bolshevism, will have to be argued on its own merits, and the argument will
necessarily turn on the ways and means of productive industry as condi-
tioned by the later growth of technology.
It has been argued, and it seems not unreasonable to believe, that the
established order of business enterprise, vested rights, and commercialized
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confusion, because it is no longer a practicable system of industrial manage-
ment under the conditions created by the later state of the industrial arts.
Twentieth-century technology has outgrown the eighteenth-century system
of vested rights. The experience of the past few years teaches that the usual
management of industry by business methods has become highly inefficient
and wasteful, and the indications are many and obvious that any business-
like control of production and distribution is bound to run more and more
consistently at cross purposes with the community's livelihood, the farther
the industrial arts advance and the wider the industrial system extends. So
that it is perhaps not reasonably to be questioned that Vested Interests in
business are riding for a fall. But the end is not yet; although it is to be
admitted, regretfully perhaps, that with every further advance in technologi-
cal knowledge and practice and with every further increase in the volume
and complexity of the industrial system, any businesslike control is bound
to grow still more incompetent, irrelevant, and impertinent.
It would be quite hazardous to guess, just yet, how far off that consumma-
tion of commercial imbecility may be. There are those who argue that the
existing system of business management is plainly due to go under within
two years' time; and there are others who are ready, with equal confidence,
to allow it a probable duration of several times that interval; although, it is
true, these latter appear, on the whole, to be persons who are less intimately
acquainted with the facts in the case. Many men experienced in the larger
affairs of industrial business are in doubt as to how long things will hold
together. But, one with another, these men who so are looking into the
doubtful future are, somewhat apprehensively, willing to admit that there is
yet something of a margin to go on; so much so that, barring accident, there
should seem to be no warrant for counting at all confidently on a disastrous
breakdown of the business system within anything like a two-year period.
And, for the reassurance of the apprehensive Guardian of the Vested
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while things are standing in their present shape, the outcome could assuredly
not be an effectual overturn of the established order; so long as no practicable
plan has been provided for taking over the management from the dead hand
of the Vested Interests. Should such a self-made breakdown come at the
present juncture, the outcome could, in fact, scarcely be anything more
serious than an interval, essentially transient though more or less protracted,
of turmoil and famine among the underlying population, together with
something of a setback to the industrial system as a whole. There seems no
reason to apprehend any substantial disallowance of the vested rights of
property to follow from such an essentially ephemeral interlude of dissen-
sion. In fact, the tenure of the Vested Interests in America should seem to be
reasonably secure, just yet. Something in the nature of riotous discontent and
factional disorder is perhaps to be looked for in the near future in this
country, and there may even be some rash gesture of revolt on the part of ill-
advised malcontents. Circumstances would seem to favor something of the
kind. It is conservatively estimated that there is already a season of privation
and uncertainty in prospect for the underlying population, which could be
averted only at the cost of some substantial interference with the vested
rights of the country's business men, — which should seem a highly
improbable alternative, in view of that spirit of filial piety with which the
public officials guard the prerogatives of business as usual. So, e.g., it is now
(September, 1919) confidently expected, or rather computed, that a fuel
famine is due in America during the approaching winter, for reasons of
sound business management; and it is likewise to be expected that for the
like reason the American transportation system is also due to go into a tangle
of congestion and idleness about the same time — barring providential
intervention in the way of unexampled weather conditions. But a season of
famine and disorderly conduct does not constitute a revolutionary overturn
of the established order; and the Vested Interests are secure in their
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This hopeful posture of things may be shown convincingly enough and
with no great expenditure of argument. To this end it is proposed to pursue
the argument somewhat further presently; by describing in outline what are
the infirmities of the regime of the Vested Interests, which the more sanguine
malcontents count on to bring that regime to an inglorious finish in the
immediate future; and also to set down, likewise in outline, what would have
to be the character of any organization of industrial forces which could be
counted on effectually to wind up the regime of the Vested Interests and take





The state of industry, in America and in the other advanced industrial
countries, will impose certain exacting conditions on any movement that
aims to displace the Vested Interests. These conditions lie in the nature of
things; that is to say, in the nature of the existing industrial system; and until
they are met in some passable fashion, this industrial system can not be taken
over in any effectual or enduring manner. And it is plain that whatever is
found to be true in these respects for America will also hold true in much the
same degree for the other countries that are dominated by the mechanical
industry and the system of absentee ownership.
It may also confidently be set down at the outset that such an impartial
review of the evidence as is here aimed at will make it appear that there need
be no present apprehension of the Vested Interests' being unseated by any
popular uprising in America, even if the popular irritation should rise very
appreciably above its present pitch, and even if certain advocates of “direct
action,” here and there, should be so ill-advised as to make some rash gesture
of revolt. The only present danger is that a boisterous campaign of repression
and inquisition on the part of the Guardians of the Vested Interests may stir
up some transient flutter of seditious disturbance.
To this end, then, it will be necessary to recall, in a summary way, those
main facts of the industrial system and of the present businesslike control of
this system which come immediately into the case. By way of general
premise it is to be noted that the established order of business rests on
absentee ownership and is managed with an eye single to the largest
obtainable net return in terms of price; that is to say, it is a system of
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population is dependent on the working of this industrial system for its
livelihood; and their material interest therefore centers in the output and
distribution of consumable goods, not in an increasing volume of earnings
for the absentee owners. Hence there is a division of interest between the
business community, who do business for the absentee owners, and the
underlying population, who work for a living; and in the nature of the case
this division of interest between the absentee owners and the underlying
population is growing wider and more evident from day to day; which
engenders a certain division of sentiment and a degree of mutual distrust.
With it all the underlying population are still in a sufficiently deferential
frame of mind toward their absentee owners, and are quite conscientiously
delicate about any abatement of the free income which their owners come in
for, according to the rules of the game as it is played.
The business concerns which so have the management of industry on this
plan of absentee ownership are capitalized on their business capacity, not on
their industrial capacity; that is to say, they are capitalized on their capacity
to produce earnings, not on their capacity to produce goods. Their capitaliza-
tion has, in effect, been calculated and fixed on the highest ordinary rate of
earnings previously obtained; and on pain of insolvency their businesslike
managers are now required to meet fixed income-charges on this capitaliza-
tion. Therefore, as a proposition of safe and sane business management,
prices have to be maintained or advanced.
From this businesslike requirement of meeting these fixed overhead charges
on the capitaliza-tion there result certain customary lines of waste and
obstruction, which are unavoidable so long as industry is managed by
businesslike methods and for businesslike ends. These ordinary lines of
waste and obstruction are necessarily (and blamelessly) included in the
businesslike conduct of production. They are many and various in detail, but
they may for convenience be classed under four heads: (a) Unemployment
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deliberately or through ignorance; (b) Salesmanship (includes, e.g., needless
multiplication of merchants and shops, wholesale and retail, newspaper
advertising and bill-boards, sales-exhibits, sales-agents, fancy packages and
labels, adulteration, multiplication of brands and proprietary articles); (c)
Production (and sales-cost) of superfluities and spurious goods; (d)
Systematic dislocation, sabotage and duplication, due in part to businesslike
strategy, in part to businesslike ignorance of industrial requirements
(includes, e.g., such things as cross-freights, monopolization of resources,
withholding of facilties and information from business rivals whom it is
thought wise to hinder or defeat).
There is, of course, no blame, and no sense of blame or shame attaching to
all this everyday waste and confusion that goes to make up the workday
total of businesslike management. All of it is a legitimate and necessary part
of the established order of business enterprise, within the law and within the
ethics of the trade.
Salesmanship is the most conspicuous, and perhaps the gravest, of these
wasteful and industrially futile practices that are involved in the businesslike
conduct of industry; it bulks large both in its immediate cost and in its
meretricious consequences. It also is altogether legitimate and indispensable
in any industrial business that deals with customers, in buying or selling;
which comes near saying, in all business that has to do with the production
or distribution of goods or services. Indeed, salesmanship is, in a way, the
whole end and substance of business enterprise; and except so far as it is
managed with a constant view to profitable bargains, the production of
goods is not a business proposition. It is the elimination of profitable
transactions of purchase and sale that is hoped for by any current movement
looking to an overturn; and it is the same elimination of profitable bargaining
that is feared, with a nerve-shattering fear, by the Guardians of the estab-
lished order. Salesmanship is also the most indispensable and most
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It is doubtless within the mark to say that, at an average, one-half the price
paid for goods and services by consumers is to be set down to the account of
salesmanship — that is, to sales-cost and to the net gains of salesmanship.
But in many notable lines of merchandise the sales-cost will ordinarily foot
up to some ten or twenty times the production-cost proper, and to not less
than one hundred times the necessary cost of distribution. All this is not a
matter for shame or distaste. In fact, just now more than ever, there is a
clamorous and visibly growing insistence on the paramount merit and
importance of salesmanship as the main stay of commerce and industry, and
a strenuous demand for more extensive and more thorough training in
salesmanship of a larger number of young men — at the public expense —
to enable a shrewdly limited output of goods to be sold at more profitable
prices — at the public cost. So also there is a visibly increasing expenditure
on all manner of advertising; and the spokesmen of this enterprise in
conspicuous waste are “pointing with pride” to the fact that the American
business community have already spent upward of $600,000,000 on bill-
boards alone within the past year, not to speak of much larger sums spent on
newspapers and other printed matter for the same purpose — and the
common man pays the cost.
At the same time advertising and manoeuvres of salesmanlike spell-binding
appear to be the only resource to which the country's business men know
how to turn for relief from that tangle of difficulties into which the outbreak
of a businesslike peace has precipitated the commercialized world. Increased
sales-cost is to remedy the evils of under-production. In this connection it
may be worth while to recall, without heat or faultfinding, that all the costly
publicity that goes into sales-costs is in the nature of prevarication, when it
is not good broad mendacity; and quite necessarily so. And all the while the
proportion of sales-costs to production-costs goes on increasing, and the cost
of living grows continually greater for the underlying population, and
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and means of salesmanship.
It is reasonable to believe that this state of things, which has been coming
on gradually for some time past, will in time come to be understood and
appreciated by the underlying population, at least in some degree. And it is
likewise reasonable to believe that so soon as the underly-lying population
come to realize that all this wasteful traffic of salesmanship is using up their
productive forces, with nothing better to show for it than an increased cost
of living, they will be driven to make some move to abate the nuisance. And
just so far as this state of things is now beginning to be understood, its logical
outcome is a growing distrust of the business men and all their works and
words. But the underlying population is still very credulous about anything
that is said or done in the name of Business, and there need be no apprehen-
sion of a mutinous outbreak, just yet. But at the same time it is evident that
any plan of management which could contrive to dispense with all this
expenditure on salesmanship, or that could materially reduce sales-costs,
would have that much of a free margin to go on, and therefore that much of
an added chance of success; and so also it is evident that any other than a
businesslike management could so contrive, inasmuch as sales-costs are
incurred solely for purposes of business, not for purposes of industry; they
are incurred for the sake of private gain, not for the sake of productive work.
But there is in fact no present promise of a breakdown of business, due to
the continued increase of sales-costs; although sales-costs are bound to go on
increasing so long as the country's industry continues to be managed on
anything like the present plan. In fact, salesmanship is the chief factor in that
ever-increasing cost of living, which is in its turn the chief ground of
prosperity among the business community and the chief source of perennial
hardship and discontent among the underlying population. Still it is worth
noting that the eventual elimination of salesmanship and sales-cost would
lighten the burden of workday production for the underlying population by
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that system of absentee ownership on which modern business enterprise
rests; and — for what it may be worth — it is to be admitted that there is
therefore that much of a drift in the existing state of things toward a
revolutionary overturn looking to the unseating of the Vested Interests. But
at the same time the elimination of salesmanship and all its voluminous
apparatus and traffic would also cut down the capitalized income of the
business community by something like one-half; and that contingency is not
to be contemplated, not to say with equanimity, by the Guardians; and it is
after all in the hands of these Guardians that the fortunes of the community
rest. Such a move is a moral impossibility, just yet.
Closely related to the wasteful practices of salesmanship as commonly
understood, if it should not rather be counted in as an extension of salesman-
ship, is that persistent unemployment of men, equipment, and material
resources, by which the output of goods and services is kept down to the
“requirements of the market,” with a view to maintaining prices at a
“reasonably profitable level.” Such unemployment, deliberate and habitual,
is one of the ordinary expedients employed in the businesslike management
of industry. There is always more or less of it in ordinary times. “Reasonable
earnings” could not be assured without it; because “what the traffic will
bear” in the way of an output of goods is by no means the same as the
productive capacity of the industrial system; still less is it the same as the
total consumptive needs of the community; in fact, it does not visibly tend to
coincide with either. It is more particularly in times of popular distress, such
as the present year, when the current output of goods is not nearly sufficient
to cover the consumptive needs of the community, that considerations of
business strategy call for a wise unemployment of the country's productive
forces. At the same time, such businesslike unemployment of equipment and
man power is the most obvious cause of popular distress.
All this is well known to the Guardians of the Vested Interests, and their
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see no help for it; and indeed there is no help for it within the framework of
“business as usual,” since it is the essence of business as usual. So also, the
Guardians are aware that this businesslike sabotage on productive industry
is a fruitful source of discontent and distrust among the underlying
population who suffer the inconvenience of it all; and they are beset with the
abiding fear that the underlying population may shortly be provoked into
disallowing those Vested Interests for whose benefit this deliberate and
habitual sabotage on production is carried on. It is felt that here again is a
sufficient reason why the businesslike management of industry should be
discontinued; which is the same as saying that here again is a visibly
sufficient reason for such a revolutionary overturn as will close out the Old
Order of absentee ownership and capitalized income. It is also evident that
any plan which shall contrive to dispense with, this deliberate and habitual
unemployment of men and equipment will have that much more of a margin
to go on, both in respect of practical efficiency and in respect of popular
tolerance; and evidently, too, any other than a businesslike management of
industry can so contrive, as a matter of course; inasmuch as any such
unbusinesslike administration — as, e.g., the Soviet — will be relieved of the
businesslike manager's blackest bug-bear, “a reasonably profitable level of
prices.”
But for all that, those shudderingly sanguine persons who are looking for
a dissolution of the system of absentee ownership within two years' time are
not counting on salesmanlike waste and businesslike sabotage to bring on the
collapse, so much as they count on the item listed under (d) above — the
systematic dislocation and all-round defeat of productive industry which is
due in part to shrewd manoeuvres of businesslike strategy, in part to the
habitual ignorance of business men touching the systematic requirements of
the industrial system as a whole. The shrewd worldly wisdom of the
businesslike managers, looking consistently to the main chance, works in
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about what amounts to effectual team-work for the defeat of the country's
industrial system as a going concern. Yet doubtless this sinister hope of a
collapse within two years is too sanguine. Doubtless the underlying
population can be counted on stolidly to put up with what they are so well
used to, just yet; more particularly so long as they are not in the habit of
thinking about these things at all. Nor does it seem reasonable to believe that
this all-pervading waste and confusion of industrial forces will of itself bring
the business organization to a collapse within so short a time.
It is true, the industrial system is continually growing, in volume and
complication; and with every new extension of its scope and range, and with
every added increment of technological practice that goes into effect, there
comes a new and urgent opportunity for the business men in control to
extend and speed up their strategy of mutual obstruction and defeat; it is all
in the day's work. As the industrial system grows larger and more closely
interwoven it offers continually larger and more enticing opportunities for
such businesslike manoeuvres as will effectually derange the system at the
same time that they bring the desired tactical defeat on some business rival;
whereby the successful business strategist is enabled to get a little something
for nothing at a constantly increasing cost to the community at large. With
every increment of growth and maturity the country's industrial system
becomes more delicately balanced, more intricately bound in a web of
industrial give and take, more sensitive to far-reaching derangement by any
local dislocation, more widely and instantly responsive to any failure of the
due correlation at any point; and by the same move the captains of industry,
to whose care the interests of absentee ownership are entrusted, are enabled,
or rather they are driven by the necessities of competitive business, to plan
their strategy of mutual defeat and derangement on larger and more intricate
lines, with an ever wider reach and a more massive mobilization of forces.
From which follows an ever increasing insecurity of work and output from
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long run; incidentally coupled with increased hardship for the underlying
population, which comes in all along as a subsidiary matter of course,
unfortunate but unavoidable. It is this visibly growing failure of the present
businesslike management to come up to the industrial necessities of the case;
its unfitness to take anything like reasonable care of the needed correlation
of industrial forces within the system; its continual working at cross purposes
in the allocation of energy resources, materials, and man power — it is this
fact, that any businesslike management of necessity runs at cross purposes
with the larger technical realities of the industrial system, that chiefly goes
to persuade apprehensive persons that the regime of business enterprise is
fast approaching the limit of tolerance. So it is held by many that this existing
system of absentee ownership must presently break down and precipitate the
abdication of the Vested Interests, under conviction of total imbecility.
The theory on which these apprehensive persons proceed appears to be
substantially sound, so far as it goes, but they reach an unguardedly
desperate conclusion because they overlook one of the main facts of the case.
There is no reasonable exception to be taken to the statement that the
country's industrial system is forever growing more extensive and more
complex; that it is continually taking on more of the character of a close-knit,
interwoven, systematic whole; a delicately balanced moving equilibrium of
working parts, no one of which can do its work by itself at all, and none of
which can do its share of the work well except in close correlation with all the
rest. At the same time it is also true that, in the commercialized nature of
things, the businesslike management of industry is forever playing fast and
loose with this delicately balanced moving equilibrium of forces, on which
the livelihood of the underlying population depends from day to day; more
particularly is this true for that large-scale business enterprise that rests on
absentee ownership and makes up the country's greater Vested Interests. But
to all this it is to be added, as a corrective and a main factor in the case, that
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the production of goods and services, even when, as usual, the business men,
for business reasons, will allow it to work only under a large handicap of
unemployment and obstructive tactics. Hitherto the margin for error, that is
to say for wasteful strategy and obstructive ignorance, has been very wide;
so wide that it has saved the life of the Vested Interests; and it is accordingly
by no means confidently to be believed that all these ampler opportunities
for swift and wide-reaching derangement will enable the strategy of business
enterprise to bring on a disastrous collapse, just yet.
It is true, if the country's productive industry were competently organized
as a systematic whole, and were then managed by competent technicians
with an eye single to maximum production of goods and services; instead of,
as now, being manhandled by ignorant business men with an eye single to
maximum profits; the resulting output of goods and services would
doubtless exceed the current output by several hundred per cent. But then,
none of all that is necessary to save the established order of things. All that
is required is a decent modicum of efficiency, very far short of the theoretical
maximum production. In effect, the community is in the habit of getting
along contentedly on something appreciably less than one-half the output
which its industrial equipment would turn out if it were working uninter-
ruptedly at full capacity; even when, as usual, something like one-half of the
actual output is consumed in wasteful superfluities. The margin for waste
and error is very wide, fortunately; and, in effect, a more patient and more
inclusive survey of the facts in the case would suffice to show that the tenure
of the Vested Interests is reasonably secure just yet; at least in so far as it
turns on considerations of this nature.
There is, of course, the chance, and it is by no means a remote chance, that
the rapidly increasing volume and complexity of the industrial system may
presently bring the country's industry into such a ticklish state of unstable
equilibrium that even a reasonable modicum of willful derangement can no
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businesslike strategy and vested rights. In time, such an outcome is
presumably due to be looked for. There is, indeed, no lack of evidence that
the advanced industrial countries are approaching such a state of things,
America among the rest. The margin for error and wasteful strategy is, in
effect, being continually narrowed by the further advance of the industrial
arts. With every further advance in the way of specialization and standard-
ization, in point of kind, quantity, quality, and time, the tolerance of the
system as a whole under any strategic maladjustment grows continually
narrower.
How soon the limit of tolerance for willful derangement is due to be
reached, would be a hazardous topic of speculation. There is now a fair
prospect that the coming winter may throw some light on that dark question;
but this is not saying that the end is in sight. What is here insisted on is that
that sinister eventuality lies yet in the future, although it may be in the
calculable future.
So also it is well to keep in mind that even a fairly disastrous collapse of the
existing system of businesslike management need by no means prove fatal
to the Vested Interests, just yet; not so long as there is no competent
organization ready to take their place and administer the country's industry
on a more reasonable plan. It is necessarily a question of alternatives.
In all this argument that runs on perennial dislocation and cross purposes,
it is assumed that the existing businesslike management of industry is of a
competitive nature and necessarily moves on lines of competitive strategy.
As a subsidiary premise it is, of course, also assumed that the captains of
industry who have the direction of this competitive strategy are ordinarily
sufficiently ill informed on technological matters to go wrong, industrially
speaking, even with the most pacific and benevolent intentions. They are
laymen in all that concerns the technical demands of industrial production.
This latter, and minor, assumption therefore need not be argued; it is
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above, that current business enterprise is of a competitive nature, is likely to
be questioned by many who believe themselves to be familiar with the facts
in the case. It is argued, by one and another, that the country's business
concerns have entered into consolidations, coalitions, understandings and
working arrangements among themselves — syndicates, trusts, pools,
combinations, interlocking directorates, gentlemen's agreements, employers'
unions — to such an extent as virtually to cover the field of that large-scale
business that sets the pace and governs the movements of the rest; and that
where combination takes effect in this way, competition ceases. So also it will
be argued that where there has been no formal coalition of interests the
business men in charge will still commonly act in collusion, with much the
same result. The suggestion is also ready to hand that in so far as business-
like sabotage of this competitive order is still to be met with, it can all be
corrected by such a further consolidation of interests as will do away with all
occasion for competitive cross purposes within the industrial system.
It is not easy to see just how far that line of argument would lead; but to
make it effective and to cover the case it would plainly have to result in so
wide a coalition of interests and pooling of management as would, in effect,
eliminate all occasion for businesslike management within the system, and
leave the underlying population quite unreservedly at the disposal of the
resulting coalition of interests — an outcome which is presumably not
contemplated. And even so, the argument takes account of only one strand
in that three-ply rope that goes to fashion the fatal noose. The remaining two
are stout enough, and they have not been touched. It is true, economists and
others who have canvassed this matter of competition have commonly given
their attention to this one line of competition alone — between rival
commercial interests — because this competition is conceived to be natural
and normal and to serve the common good. But there remains (a) the
competition between those business men who buy cheap and sell dear and
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and (b) the competition between the captains of industry and those absentee
owners in whose name and with whose funds the captains do business. In
the typical case, modern business enterprise takes the corporate form, is
organized on credit, and therefore rests on absentee ownership; from which
it follows that in all large-scale business the owners are not the same persons
as the managers, nor does the interest of the manager commonly coincide
with that of his absentee owners, particularly in the modern “big business.”
So it follows that even a coalition of Vested Interests which should be
virtually all-inclusive, would still have to make up its account with “what the
traffic will bear,” that is to say what will bring the largest net income in terms
of price; that is to say, the coalition would still be under the competitive
necessity of buying cheap and selling dear, to the best of its ability and with
the use of all the facilities which its dominant position in the market would
give. The coalition, therefore, would still be under the necessity of shrewdly
limiting the output of goods and services to such a rate and volume as will
maintain or advance prices; and also to vary its manipulation of prices and
supply from place to place and from time to time, to turn an honest penny;
which leaves the case very near the point of beginning. But then, such a
remedy for these infelicities of the competitive system will probably be
admitted to be chimerical, without argument.
But what is more to the point is the fact, known even when it is not avowed,
that the consolidations which have been effected hitherto have not eliminated
competition, nor have they changed the character of the competitive strategy
employed, although they have altered its scale and methods. What can be
said is that the underlying corporations of the holding companies, e.g., are
no longer competitors among themselves on the ancient footing. But strategic
dislocation and cross purposes continue to be the order of the day in the
businesslike management of industry; and the volume of habitual unemploy-
ment, whether of equipment or of man power, continues undiminished and
unashamed — which is after all a major count in the case.Thorstein Veblen,  The Engineers and the Price System, 79
It is well to recognize what the business men among themselves always
recognize as a matter of course, that business is in the last analysis always
carried on for the private advantage of the individual business men who
carry it on. And these enterprising persons, being business men, will always
be competitors for gain among themselves, however much and well they
may combine for a common purpose as against the rest of the community.
The end and aim of any gainful enterprise carried through in common is
always the division of the joint gains, and in this division the joint partici-
pants always figure as competitors. The syndicates, coalitions, corporations,
consolidations of interests, so entered into in the pursuit of gain are, in effect,
in the nature of conspiracies between business men each seeking his own
advantage at the cost of any whom it may concern. There is no ulterior
solidarity of interests among the participants in such a joint enterprise.
By way of illustration, what is set forth in the voluminous testimony taken
in the Colton case, before the California courts, having to do with the affairs
of the Southern Pacific and its subsidiaries, will show in what fashion the
businesslike incentives of associated individuals may be expected to work
out in the partition of benefits within a given coalition. And not only is there
no abiding solidarity of interests between the several participants in such a
joint enterprise, so far as regards the final division of the spoils, but it is also
true that the business interest of the manager in charge of such a syndicate
of absentee ownership will not coincide with the collective interest of the
coalition as a going concern. As an illustrative instance may be cited the
testimony of the great president of the two Great Northern railways, taken
before a Congressional commission, wherein it is explained somewhat fully
that for something like a quarter-century the two great roads under his
management had never come in for reasonable earnings on their invested
capital. And it is a matter of common notoriety, although it was charitably
not brought out in the hearings of the commission, that during his incum-
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president had by thrift and management increased his own private
possessions from $20 to something variously estimated at $150,000,000 to
$200,000,000; while his two chief associates in this adventure had retired
from the management on a similarly comfortable footing; so notably
comfortable, indeed, as to have merited a couple of very decent peerages
under the British crown.
In effect, there still is an open call for shrewd personal strategy at the cost
of any whom it may concern; all the while that there is also a very apprecia-
ble measure of collusion among the Vested Interests, at the cost of any whom
it may concern. Business is still competitive business, competitive pursuit of
private gain; as how should it not be? seeing that the incentive to all business
is after all private gain at the cost of any whom it may concern.
By reason of doctrinal consistency and loyalty to tradition, the certified
economists have habitually described business enterprise as a rational
arrangement for administering the country's industrial system and assuring
a full and equitable distribution of consumable goods to the consumers.
There need be no quarrel with that view. But it is only fair to enter the
reservation that, considered as an arrangement for administering the
country's industrial system, business enterprise based on absentee ownership
has the defects of its qualities; and these defects of this good old plan are now
calling attention to themselves. Hitherto, and ever since the mechanical
industry first came into the dominant place in this industrial system, the
defects of this businesslike management of industry have continually been
encroaching more and more on its qualities. It took its rise as a system of
management by the owners of the industrial equipment, and it has in its riper
years grown into a system of absentee ownership managed by quasi-
responsible financial agents. Having begun as an industrial community
which centered about an open market, it has matured into a community of
Vested Interests whose vested right it is to keep up prices by a short supply
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arrangement for controlling the production and distribution of goods and
services through the agency of absentee ownership has now come to be, in
the main, a blundering muddle of defects. For the purpose in hand, that is to
say with a view to the probable chance of any revolutionary overturn, this
may serve as a fair characterization of the regime of the Vested Interests;
whose continued rule is now believed by their Guardians to be threatened
by a popular uprising in the nature of Bolshevism. Now, as to the country's
industrial system which is manhandled on this businesslike plan; it is a
comprehensive and balanced scheme of technological administration.
Industry of this modern sort — mechanical, specialized, standardized,
running to quantity production, drawn on a large scale — is highly
productive; provided always that the necessary conditions of its working are
met in some passable fashion. These necessary conditions of productive
industry are of a well-defined technical character, and they are growing more
and more exacting with every farther advance in the industrial arts. This
mechanical industry draws always more and more largely and urgently on
the natural sources of mechanical power, and it necessarily makes use of an
ever increasingly wide and varied range of materials, drawn from all
latitudes and all geographical regions, in spite of obstructive national
frontiers and patriotic animosities; for the mechanical technology is
impersonal and dispassionate, and its end is very simply to serve human
needs, without fear or favor or respect of persons, prerogatives, or politics.
It makes up an industrial system of an unexampled character — a mechani-
cally balanced and interlocking system of work to be done, the prime
requisite of whose working is a painstaking and intelligent co-ordination of
the processes at work, and an equally painstaking allocation of mechanical
power and materials. The foundation and driving force of it all is a massive
body by technological knowledge, of a highly impersonal and altogether
unbusinesslike nature, running in close contact with the material sciences, on
which it draws freely at every turn — exact-ingly specialized, endlesslyThorstein Veblen,  The Engineers and the Price System, 82
detailed, reaching out into all domains of empirical fact.
Such is the system of productive work which has grown out of the
Industrial Revolution, and on the full and free run of which the material
welfare of all the civilized peoples now depends from day to day. Any defect
or hindrance in its technical administration, any intrusion of nontechnical
considerations, any failure or obstruction at any point, unavoidably results
in a disproportionate set-back to the balanced whole and brings a dispropor-
tionate burden of privation on all these peoples whose productive industry
has come within the sweep of the system.
It follows that those gifted, trained, and experienced technicians who now
are in possession of the requisite technological information and experience
are the first and instantly indispensable factor in the everyday work of
carrying on the country's productive industry. They now constitute the
General Staff of the industrial system, in fact; whatever law and custom may
formally say in protest. The “captains of industry” may still vaingloriously
claim that distinction, and law and custom still countenance their claim; but
the captains have no technological value, in fact.
Therefore any question of a revolutionary overturn, in America or in any
other of the advanced industrial countries, resolves itself in practical fact into
a question of what the guild of technicians will do. In effect it is a question
whether the discretion and responsibility in the management of the country's
industry shall pass from the financiers, who speak for the Vested Interests,
to the technicians, who speak for the industrial system as a going concern.
There is no third party qualified to make a colorable bid, or able to make
good its pretensions if it should make a bid. So long as the vested rights of
absentee ownership remain intact, the financial powers — that is to say the
Vested Interests —. will continue to dispose of the country's industrial forces
for their own profit; and so soon, or so far, as these vested rights give way,
the control of the people's material welfare will pass into the hands of the
technicians. There is no third party.Thorstein Veblen,  The Engineers and the Price System, 83
The chances of anything like a Soviet in America, therefore, are the chances
of a Soviet of technicians. And, to the due comfort of the Guardians of the
Vested Interests and the good citizens who make up their background, it can
be shown that anything like a Soviet of Technicians is at the most a remote
contingency in America.
It is true, so long as no such change of base is made, what is confidently to
be looked for is a regime of continued and increasing shame and confusion,
hardship and dissension, unemployment and privation, waste and insecurity
of person and property — such as the rule of the Vested Interests in business
has already made increasingly familiar to all the civilized peoples. But the
vested rights of absentee ownership are still embedded in the sentiments of
the underlying population, and still continue to be the Palladium of the
Republic; and the assertion is still quite safe that anything like a Soviet of
Technicians is not a present menace to the Vested Interests in America.
By settled habit the technicians, the engineers and industrial experts, are a
harmless and docile sort, well fed on the whole, and somewhat placidly
content with the “full dinner-pail” which the lieutenants of the Vested
Interests habitually allow them. It is true, they constitute the indispensable
General Staff of that industrial system which feeds the Vested Interests; but
hitherto at least, they have had nothing to say in the planning and direction
of this industrial system, except as employees in the pay of the financiers.
They have, hitherto, been quite unreflectingly content to work piecemeal,
without much of an understanding among themselves, unreservedly doing
job-work for the Vested Interests; and they have without much reflection lent
themselves and their technical powers freely to the obstructive tactics of the
captains of industry; all the while that the training which makes them
technicians is but a specialized extension of that joint stock of technological
knowledge that has been carried forward out of the past by the community
at large.
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means — dear-bought on the part of the underlying community — are the
pillars of that house of industry in which the Vested Interests continue to
live. Without their continued and unremitting supervision and direction the
industrial system would cease to be a working system at all; whereas it is not
easy to see how the elimination of the existing businesslike control could
bring anything but relief and heightened efficiency to this working system,
The technicians are indispensable to productive industry of this mechanical
sort; the Vested Interests and their absentee owners are not. The technicians
are indispensable to the Vested Interests and their absentee owners, as a
working force without which there would be no industrial output to control
or divide; whereas the Vested Interests and their absentee owners are of no
material consequence to the technicians and their work, except as an
extraneous interference and obstruction.
It follows that the material welfare of all the advanced industrial peoples
rests in the hands of these technicians, if they will only see it that way, take
counsel together, constitute themselves the self-directing General Staff of the
country's industry, and dispense with the interference of the lieutenants of
the absentee owners. Already they are strategically in a position to take the
lead and impose their own terms of leadership, so soon as they, or a decisive
number of them, shall reach a common understanding to that effect and
agree on a plan of action.
But there is assuredly no present promise of the technicians' turning their
insight and common sense to such a use. There need be no present apprehen-
sion. The technicians are a “safe and sane” lot, on the whole; and they are
pretty well commercialized, particularly the older generation, who speak
with authority and conviction, and to whom the younger generation of
engineers defer, on the whole, with such a degree of filial piety as should go
far to reassure all good citizens. And herein lies the present security of the
Vested Interests, as well as the fatuity of any present alarm about Bolshevism
and the like; for the whole-hearted co-operation of the technicians would beThorstein Veblen,  The Engineers and the Price System, 85
as indispensable to any effectual movement of overturn as their unwavering
service in the employ of the Vested Interests is indispensable to the




It is the purpose of this memorandum to show, in an objective way, that
under existing circumstances there need be no fear, and no hope, of an
effectual revolutionary overturn in America, such as would unsettle the
established order and unseat those Vested Interests that now control the
country's industrial system. In an earlier paper (Chapter IV,) it has been
argued that no effectual move in the direction of such an overturn can be
made except on the initiative and under the direction of the country's
technicians, taking action in common and on a concerted plan. Notoriously,
no move of this nature has been made hitherto, nor is there evidence that
anything of the kind has been contemplated by the technicians. They still are
consistently loyal, with something more than a hired-man's loyalty, to the
established order of commercial profit and absentee ownership. And any
adequate plan of concerted action, such as would be required for the
enterprise in question, is not a small matter that can be arranged between
two days.
Any plan of action that shall hope to meet the requirements of the case in
any passable fashion must necessarily have the benefit of mature delib-
eration among the technicians who are competent to initiate such an
enterprise; it must engage the intelligent co-operation of several thousand
technically trained men scattered over the face of the country, in one industry
and another; must carry out a passably complete cadastration of the
country's industrial forces; must set up practicable organization tables
covering the country's industry in some detail,— energy-resources, materials,
and man power; and it must also engage the aggressive support of the
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industries. These are initial requirements, indispensable to the initiation of
any enterprise of the kind in such an industrial country as America; and so
soon as this is called to mind it will be realised that any fear of an effectual
move in this direction at present is quite chimerical. So that, in fact, it may be
set down without a touch of ambiguity that absentee ownership is secure,
just yet.
Therefore, to show conclusively and in an objective way how remote any
contingency of this nature still is, it is here proposed to set out in a summary
fashion the main lines which any such concerted plan of action would have
to follow, and what will of necessity be the manner of organization which
alone can hope to take over the industrial system, following the eventual
abdication or dispossession of the Vested Interests and their absentee
owners. And, by way of parenthesis, it is always the self-made though
reluctant abdication of the Vested Interests and their absentee owners, rather
than their forcible dispossession, that is to be looked for as a reasonably
probable event in the calculable future. It should, in effect, cause no surprise
to find that they will, in a sense, eliminate themselves, by letting go quite
involuntarily after the industrial situation gets quite beyond their control. In
fact, they have, in the present difficult juncture, already sufficiently shown
their unfitness to take care of the country's material welfare,— which is after
all the only ground on which they can set up a colorable claim to their vested
rights. At the same time something like an opening bid for a bargain of
abdication has already come in from more than one quarter. So that a
discontinuance of the existing system of absentee ownership, on one plan or
another, is no longer to be considered a purely speculative novelty; and an
objective canvass of the manner of organization that is to be looked to to take
the place of the control now exercised by the Vested Interests — in the event
of their prospective abdication — should accordingly have some present
interest, even apart from its bearing on the moot question of any forcible
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As a matter of course, the powers and duties of the incoming directorate
will be of a technological nature, in the main if not altogether; inasmuch as
the purpose of its coming into control is the care of the community's material
welfare by a more competent management of the country's industrial system.
It may be added that even in the unexpected event that the contemplated,
overturn should, in the beginning, meet with armed opposition from the
partisans of the old order, it will still be true that the duties of the incoming
directorate will be of a technological character, in the main; inasmuch as
warlike operations are also now substantially a matter of technology, both in
the immediate conduct of hostilities and in the still more urgent work of
material support and supply.
The incoming industrial order is designed to correct the shortcomings of the
old. The duties and powers of the incoming directorate will accordingly
ccnverge on those points in the admin-istration of industry where the old
order has most signally fallen short; that is to say, on the due allocation of
resources and a consequent full and reasonably proportioned employment
of the available equipment and man power; on the avoidance of waste and
duplication of work; and on an equitable and sufficient supply of goods and
services to consumers. Evidently the most immediate and most urgent work
to be taken over by the incoming directorate is that for want of which under
the old order the industrial system has been working slack and at cross
purposes; that is to say the due allocation of available resources, in power,
equipment, and materials, among the greater primary industries. For this
necessary work of allocation there has been substantially no provision under
the old order.
To carry on this allocation, the country's transportation system must be
placed at the disposal of the same staff that has the work of allocation to do;
since, under modern conditions, any such allocation will take effect only by
use of the transportation system. But, by the same token, the effectual control
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same hands; since the traffic in consumable goods is also a matter of
transportation, in the main.
On these considerations, which would only be reinforced by a more
detailed inquiry into the work to be done, the central directorate will
apparently take the shape of a loosely tripartite executive council, with
power to act in matters of industrial administration; the council to include
technicians whose qualifications enable them to be called Resource Engi-
neers, together with similarly competent spokesmen of the transportation
system and of the distributive traffic in finished products and services. With
a view to efficiency and expedition, the executive council will presumably
not be a numerous body; although its staff of intelligence and advice may be
expected to be fairly large, and it will be guided by current consultation with
the accredited spokesmen (deputies, commissioners, executives, or whatever
they may be called) of the several main subdivisions of productive industry,
transportation, and distributive traffic.
Armed with these powers and working in due consultation with a sufficient
ramification of sub-centers and local councils, this industrial directorate
should be in a position to avoid virtually all unemployment of serviceable
equipment and man power on the one hand, and all local or seasonal scarcity
on the other hand. The main line of duties indicated by the character of the
work incumbent on the directorate, as well as the main line of qualifications
in its personnel, both executive and advisory, is such as will call for the
services of Production Engineers, to use a term which is coming into use. But
it is also evident that in its continued work of planning and advisement the
directorate will require the services of an appreciable number of consulting
economists; men who are qualified to be called Production Economists.
The profession now includes men with the requisite qualifications, although
it cannot be said that the gild of economists is made up of such men in the
main. Quite blamelessly, the economists have, by tradition and by force of
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ways and means of salesmanship, financial traffic, and the distribution of
income and property, rather than a study of the industrial system considered
as a ways and means of producing goods and services. Yet there now are,
after all, especially among the younger generation, an appreciable number,
perhaps an adequate number, of economists who have learned that
“business” is not “industry” and that investment is not production. And,
here as always, the best is good enough, perforce.
“Consulting economists” of this order are a necessary adjunct to the
personnel of the central directorate, because the technical training that goes
to make a resource engineer, or a production engineer, or indeed a competent
industrial expert in any line of specialization, is not of a kind to give him the
requisite sure and facile insight into the play of economic forces at large; and
as a matter of notorious fact, very few of the technicians have gone at all far
afield to acquaint themselves with anything more to the point in this
connection than the half-forgotten commonplaces of the old order. The
“consulting economist” is accordingly necessary to cover an otherwise
uncovered joint in the new articulation of things. His place in the scheme is
analogous to the part which legal counsel now plays in the manoeuvres of
diplomatists and statesmen; and the discretionary personnel of the incoming
directorate are to be, in effect, something in the way of industrial statesmen
under the new order.
There is also a certain general reservation to be made with regard to
personnel, which may conveniently be spoken of at this point. To avoid
persistent confusion and prospective defeat, it will be necessary to exclude
from all positions of trust and executive responsibility all persons who have
been trained for business or who have had experience in business undertak-
ings of the larger sort. This will apply generally, throughout the administra-
tive scheme, although it will apply more imperatively as regards the
responsible personnel of the directorate, central and subordinate, together
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essential. What is wanted is training in the ways and means of productive
industry, not in the ways and means of salesmanship and profitable
investment.
By force of habit, men trained to a businesslike view of what is right and
real will be irretrievably biassed against any plan of production and
distribution that is not drawn in terms of commercial profit and loss and
does not provide a margin of free income to go to absentee owners. The
personal exceptions to the rule are apparently very few. But this one point is
after all of relatively minor consequence. What is more to the point in the
same connection is that the commercial bias induced by their training in
businesslike ways of thinking leaves them incapable of anything like an
effectual insight into the use of resources or the needs and aims of productive
industry, in any other terms than those of commercial profit and loss. Their
units and standards of valuation and accountancy are units and standards of
price, and of private gain in terms of price; whereas for any scheme of
productive industry which runs, not on salesmanship and earnings, but on
tangible performances and tangible benefit to the community at large, the
valuations and accountancy of salesmanship and earnings are misleading.
With the best and most benevolent intentions, men so trained will unavoid-
ably make their appraisals of production and their disposition of productive
forces in the only practical terms with which they are familiar, the terms of
commercial accountancy ; which is the same as saying, the accountancy of
absentee ownership and free income; all of which it is the abiding purpose
of the projected plan to displace. For the purposes of this projected new order
of production, therefore, the experienced and capable business men are at the
best to be rated as well-intentioned deaf-mute blind men. Their wisest
judgment and sincerest endeavors become meaningless and misguided so
soon as the controlling purpose of industry shifts from the footing of profits
on absentee investment to that of a serviceable output of goods.
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appear to be a taking of precautions about a vacant formality; but it is as well
to recall that by trained propensity and tradition the business men, great and
small, are after all, each in their degree, lieutenants of those Vested Interests
which the projected organization of industry is designed to displace,—
schooled in their tactics and marching under their banners. The experience
of the war administration and its management of industry by help of the
business men during the past few years goes to show what manner of
industrial wisdom is to be looked for where capable and well-intentioned
business men are called in to direct industry with a view to maximum
production and economy. For its responsible personnel the administration
has uniformly drawn on experienced business men, preferably men of
successful experience in Big Business; that is to say, trained men with a
shrewd eye to the main chance. And the tale of its adventures, so far as a
businesslike reticence has allowed them to become known, is an amazing
comedy of errors; which runs to substantially the same issue whether it is
told of one or another of the many departments, boards, councils, commis-
sions, and administrations, that have had this work to do.
Notoriously, this choice of personnel has with singular uniformity proved
to be of doubtful ad-viability, not to choose a harsher epithet. The policies
pursued, doubtless with the best and most sagacious intentions of which this
businesslike personnel have been capable, have uniformly resulted in the
safeguarding of investments and the allocation of commercial profits; all the
while that the avowed aim of it all, and doubtless the conscientious purpose
of the businesslike administrators, has been quantity production of essential
goods. The more that comes to light, the more visible becomes the difference
between the avowed purpose and the tangible performance. Tangible
performance in the way of productive industry is precisely what the business
men do not know how to propose, but it is also that on which the possible
success of any projected plan of overturn will always rest. Yet it is also to be
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like administrators to break away from their life-long rule of reasonable
earnings, appear to have resulted in a very appreciably increased industrial
output per unit of man power and equipment employed. That such was the
outcome under the war administration is presumably due in great part to the
fact that the business men in charge were unable to exercise so strict a control
over the working force of technicians and skilled operatives during that
period of stress. And here the argument comes in touch with one of the
substantial reasons why there need be no present fear of a revolutionary
overturn. By settled habit, the American population are quite unable to see
their way to entrust any appreciable responsibility to any other than business
men; at the same time that such a move of overturn can hope to succeed only
if it excludes the business men from all positions of responsibility. This
sentimental deference of the American people to the sagacity of its business
men is massive, profound, and alert. So much so that it will take harsh and
protracted experience to remove it, or to divert it sufficiently for the purpose
of any revolutionary diversion. And more particularly, popular sentiment in
this country will not tolerate the assumption of responsibility by the
technicians, who are in the popular apprehension conceived to be a
somewhat fantastic brotherhood of over-specialized cranks, not to be trusted
out of sight except under the restraining hand of safe and sane business men.
Nor are the technicians themselves in the habit of taking a greatly different
view of their own case. They still feel themselves, in the nature of things, to
fall into place as employes of those enterprising business men who are, in the
nature of things, elected to get something for nothing. Absentee ownership
is secure, just yet. In time, with sufficient provocation, this popular frame of
mind may change, of course; but it is in any case a matter of an appreciable
lapse of time.
Even such a scant and bare outline of generalities as has been hastily
sketched above will serve to show that any effectual overturn of the
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manoeuvred into shape by makeshifts after the initial move has been made.
There is no chance without deliberate preparations from beforehand. There
are two main lines of preparations that will have to be taken care of by any
body of men who may contemplate such a move: (a) An inquiry into existing
conditions and into the available ways and means; and (b) the setting up of
practicable organization tables and a survey of the available personnel. And
bound up with this work of preparation, and conditioning it, provision must
also be made for the growth of such a spirit of teamwork as will be ready to
undertake and undergo this critical adventure. All of which will take time.
It will be necessary to investigate and to set out in a convincing way what
are the various kinds and lines of waste that are necessarily involved in the
present businesslike control of industry; what are the abiding causes of these
wasteful and obstructive practices; and what economies of management and
production will become practicable on the elimination of the present
businesslike control. This will call for diligent teamwork on the part of a
suitable group of economists and engineers, who will have to be drawn
together by self-selection on the basis of a common interest in productive
efficiency, economical use of resources, and an equitable distribution of the
consumable output. Hitherto no such self-selection of competent persons has
visibly taken place, and the beginnings of a plan for team-work in carrying
on such an inquiry are yet to be made.
In the course of this contemplated inquiry and on the basis afforded by its
findings there is no less serious work to be done in the way of deliberation
and advisement, among the members of the group in question and in
consultation with outside technological men who know what can best be
done with the means in hand, and whose interest in things drives them to dip
into the same gain-less adventure. This will involve the setting up of
organization tables to cover the efficient use of the available resources and
equipment, as well as to re-organize the traffic involved in the distribution
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By way of an illustrative instance, to show by an example something of
what the scope and method of this inquiry and advisement will presumably
be like, it may be remarked that under the new order the existing competitive
commercial traffic engaged in the distribution of goods to consumers will
presumably fall away, in the main, for want of a commercial incentive. It is
well known, in a general way, that the present organization of this traffic, by
wholesale and retail merchandising, involves a very large and very costly
duplication of Work, equipment, stock, and personnel,— several hundred
per cent, more than would be required by an economically efficient
management of the traffic on a reasonable plan. In looking for a way out of
the present extremely wasteful merchandising traffic, and in working out
organization tables for an equitable and efficient distribution of goods to
consumers, the experts in the case will, it is believed, be greatly helped out
by detailed information on such existing organizations as, e.g., the distribut-
ing system of the Chicago Packers, the chain stores, and the mail-order
houses. These are commercial organizations, of course, and as such they are
managed with a view to the commercial gain of their owners and managers;
but they are at the same time designed to avoid the ordinary wastes of the
ordinary retail distribution, for the benefit of their absentee owners. There
are not a few object-lessons of economy of this practical character to be found
among the Vested Interests; so much so that the economies which result from
them are among the valuable capitalized assets of these business concerns.
This contemplated inquiry will, of course, also be useful in the way of
publicity; to show, concretely and convincingly, what are the inherent defects
of the present businesslike control of industry, why these defects are
inseparable from a businesslike control under existing circumstances, and
what may fairly be expected of an industrial management which takes no
account of absentee ownership. The ways and means of publicity to be
employed is a question that plainly cannot profitably be discussed before-
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little more than a speculative interest; and much the same will have to be said
as to the scope and detail of the inquiry, which will have to be determined in
great part by the interest and qualifications of the men who are to carry it on.
Nothing but provisional generalities could at all confidently be sketched into
its program until the work is in hand.
The contemplated eventual shift to a new and more practicable system of
industrial production and distribution has been here spoken of as a
“revolutionary overturn” of the established order. This flagitious form of
words is here used chiefly because the Guardians of the established order are
plainly apprehensive of something sinister that can be called by no gentler
name, rather than with the intention of suggesting that extreme and
subversive measures alone can now save the life of the underlying popula-
tion from the increasingly disserviceable rule of the Vested Interests. The
move which is here discussed in a speculative way under this sinister form
of words, as a contingency to be guarded against by fair means and foul,
need, in effect, be nothing spectacular; assuredly it need involve no clash of
arms or fluttering of banners, unless, as is beginning to seem likely, the
Guardians of the old order should find that sort of thing expedient. In its
elements, the move will be of the simplest and most matter-of-fact character;
although there will doubtless be many intricate adjustments to be made in
detail. In principle, all that is necessarily involved is a disallowance of
absentee ownership; that is to say, the disestablishment of an institution
which has, in the course of time and change, proved to be noxious to the
common good. The rest will follow quite simply from the cancelment of this
outworn and footless vested right.
By absentee ownership, as the term applies in this connection, is here to be
understood the ownership of an industrially useful article by any person or
persons who are not habitually employed in the industrial use of it. In this
connection, office work of a commercial nature is not rated as industrial
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is so obvious an implication of the main proposition that it should scarcely
need explicit statement: An owner who is employed in the industrial use of
a given parcel of property owned by him, will still be an “absentee owner,”
within the meaning of the term, in case he is not the only person habitually
employed in its use. A further corollary follows, perhaps less obvious at first
sight, but no less convincing on closer attention to the sense of the terms
employed: Collective ownership, of the corporate form, that is to say
ownership by a collectivity instituted ad hoc, also falls away as being
unavoidably absentee ownership, within the meaning of the term. It will be
noted that all this does not touch joint ownership of property held in
undivided interest by a household group and made use of by the members
of the household conjointly. It is only in so far as the household is possessed
of useful property not made use of by its members, or not made use of
without hired help, that its ownership of such property falls within the
meaning of the term, absentee ownership. To be sufficiently explicit, it may
be added that the cancelment of absentee ownership as here understood will
apply indiscriminately to all industrially useful objects, whether realty or
personalty, whether natural resources, equipment, banking capital, or
wrought goods in stock.
As an immediate consequence of this cancelment of absentee ownership it
should seem to be altogether probable that industrially useful articles will
presently cease to be used for purposes of ownership, that is to say for
purposes of private gain; although there might be no administrative
interference with such use. Under the existing state of the industrial arts,
neither the natural resources drawn on for power and materials nor the
equipment employed in the great and controlling industries are of a nature
to lend themselves to any other than absentee ownership; and these
industries control the situation, so that private enterprise for gain on a small
scale would scarcely find a suitable market. At the same time the inducement
to private accumulation of wealth at the cost of the community wouldThorstein Veblen,  The Engineers and the Price System, 98
virtually fall away, inasmuch as the inducement to such accumulation now
is in nearly all cases an ambition to come in for something in the way of
absentee ownership. In effect, other incentives are a negligible quantity.
Evidently, the secondary effects of such cancelment will go far, in more than
one direction, but evidently, too, there could be little profit in endeavoring
to follow up these ulterior contingencies in extended speculations here.
As to the formalities, of a legal complexion, that would be involved in such
a disallowance of absentee ownership, they need also be neither large nor
intricate; at least not in their main incidence. It will in all probability take the
shape of a cancelment of all corporation securities, as an initial move. Articles
of partnership, evidences of debt, and other legal instruments which now
give title to property not in hand or not in use by the owner, will be voided
by the same act. In all probability this will be sufficient for the purpose.
This act of disallowance may be called subversive and revolutionary; but
while there is no intention here to offer anything in the way of exculpation,
it is necessary to an objective appraisal of the contemplated move to note that
the effect of such disallowance would be subversive or revolutionary only in
a figurative sense of the words. It would all of it neither subvert nor derange
any substantial mechanical contrivance or relation, nor need it materially
disturb the relations, either as workman or as consumer of goods and
services, of any appreciable number of persons now engaged in productive
industry. In fact, the disallowance will touch nothing more substantial than
a legal make-believe. This would, of course, be serious enough in its
consequences to those classes — called the kept classes — whose livelihood
hangs on the maintenance of this legal make-believe. So, likewise, it would
vacate the occupation of the “middleman,” which likewise turns on the
maintenance of this legal make-believe; which gives “title” to that to which
one stands in no material relation.
Doubtless, hardship will follow thick and fast, among those classes who are
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pity. But this evil is, after all, a side issue, as regards the present argument,
which has to do with nothing else than the practicability of the scheme. So it
is necessary to note that, however detrimental to the special interests of the
absentee owners this move may be, yet it will not in any degree derange or
diminish those material facts that constitute the ways and means of
productive industry; nor will it in any degree enfeeble or mutilate that joint
stock of technical knowledge and practice that constitutes the intellectual
working force of the industrial system. It does not directly touch the material
facts of industry, for better or worse. In this sense it is a completely idle
matter, in its immediate incidence, whatever its secondary consequences may
be believed to be.
But there is no doubt that a proposal to disallow absentee ownership will
shock the moral sensibilities of many persons; more particularly the
sensibilities of the absentee owners. To avoid the appearance of willful
neglect, therefore, it is necessary to speak also of the “moral aspect.”
There is no intention here to argue the moral merits of this contemplated
disallowance of absentee ownership; or to argue for or against such a move,
on moral or other grounds. Absentee ownership is legally sound today.
Indeed, as is well known, the Constitution includes a clause which specially
safeguards its security. If, and when, the law is changed, in this respect, what
is so legal today will of course cease to be legal. There is, in fact, not much
more to be said about it; except that, in the last resort, the economic
moralities wait on the economic necessities. The economic-moral sense of the
American community today runs unequivocally to the effect that absentee
ownership is fundamentally and eternally right and good; and it should seem
reasonable to believe that it will continue to run to that effect for some time
yet.
There has lately been some irritation and faultfinding with what is called
“profiteering” and there may be more or less uneasy discontent with what
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of income; but apprehensive persons should not lose sight of the main fact
that absentee ownership after all is the idol of every true American heart. It
is the substance of things hoped for and the reality of things not seen. To
achieve (or to inherit) a competency, that is to say to accumulate such wealth
as will assure a “decent” livelihood in industrial absentia, is the universal, and
universally laudable, ambition of all who have reached years of discretion;
but it all means the same thing — to get something for nothing, at any cost.
Similarly universal is the awestruck deference with which the larger absentee
owners are looked up to for guidance and example. These substantial citizens
are the ones who have “made good,” in the popular apprehension. They are
the great and good men whose lives “all remind us we can make our lives
sublime, etc.”
This commercialized frame of mind is a sturdy outgrowth of many
generations of consistent training in the pursuit of the main chance; it is
second nature, and there need be no fear that it will allow the Americans to
see workday facts in any other than its own perspective, just yet. The most
tenacious factor in any civilization is a settled popular frame of mind, and to
this abiding American frame of mind absentee ownership is the controlling
center of all the economic realities.
So, having made plain that all this argument on a practicable overturn of
the established order has none but a speculative interest, the argument can
go on to consider what will be the nature of the initial move of overturn
which is to break with the old order of absentee ownership and set up a
regime of workmanship governed by the country's technicians.
As has already been called to mind, repeatedly, the effective management
of the industrial system at large is already in the hands of the technicians, so
far as regards the work actually done; but it is all under the control of the
Vested Interests, representing absentee owners, so far as regards its failure
to work. And the failure is, quite reasonably, attracting much attention lately.
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may be said to represent the community at large in its industrial capacity, or
in other words the industrial system as a going concern; whereas the
business men speak for the commercial interest of the absentee owners, as a
body which holds the industrial community in usufruct. It is the part of the
technicians, between them, to know the country's available resources, in
mechanical power and equipment; to know and put in practice the joint stock
of technological knowledge which is indispensable to industrial production;
as well as to know and take care of the community's habitual need and use
of consumable goods. They are, in effect, the general staff of production
engineers, under whose surveillance the required output of goods and
services is produced and distributed to the consumers. Whereas it is the part
of the business men to know what rate and volume of production and
distribution will best serve the commercial interest of the absentee owners,
and to put this commercial knowledge in practice by nicely limiting
production and distribution of the output to such a rate and volume as their
commercial traffic will bear — that is to say, what will yield the largest net
income to the absentee owners in terms of price. In this work of sagaciously
retarding industry the captains of industry necessarily work at cross
purposes, among themselves, since the traffic is of a competitive nature.
Accordingly, in this two-cleft arrangement of administrative functions, it
is the duty of the technicians to plan the work and to carry it on; and it is the
duty of the captains of industry to see that the work will benefit none but the
captains and their associated absentee owners, and that it is not pushed
beyond the salutary minimum which their commeicial traffic will bear. In all
that concerns the planning and execution of the work done, the technicians
necessarily take the initiative and exercise the necessary creative surveillance
and direction; that being what they, and they alone, are good for; whereas the
businesslike deputies of the absentee owners sagaciously exercise a running
veto power over the technicians and their productive industry. They are able
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the technicians are, in effect, their employes, hired to do their bidding and
fired if they do not; and perhaps no less by this other fact, that the technicians
have hitherto been working piecemeal, as scattered individuals under their
master's eye; they have hitherto not drawn together on their own ground and
taken counsel together as a general staff of industry, to determine what had
best be done and what not. So that they have hitherto figured in the conduct
of the country's industrial enterprise only as a technological extension of the
business men's grasp on the commercial main chance.
Yet, immediately and unremittingly, the technicians and their advice and
surveillance are essential to any work whatever in those great primary
industries on which the country's productive systems turn, and which set the
pace for all the rest. And it is obvious that so soon as they shall draw
together, in a reasonably inclusive way, and take common counsel as to what
had best be done, they are in a position to say what work shall be done and
to fix the terms on which it is to be done. In short, so far as regards the
technical requirements of the case, the situation is ready for a self-selected,
but inclusive, Soviet of technicians to take over the economic affairs of the
country and to allow and disallow what they may agree on; provided always
that they live within the requirements of that state of the industrial arts
whose keepers they are, and provided that their pretensions continue to have
the support of the industrial rank and file; which comes near saying that their
Soviet must consistently and effectually take care of the material welfare of
the underlying population.
Now, this revolutionary posture of the present state of the industrial arts
may be undesirable, in some respects, but there is nothing to be gained by
denying the fact. So soon — but only so soon — as the engineers draw
together, take common counsel, work out a plan of action, and decide to
disallow absentee ownership out of hand, that move will have been made.
The obvious and simple means of doing it is a conscientious withdrawal of
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staff of technicians as will suffice to incapacitate the industrial system at large
by their withdrawal, for such time as may be required to enforce their
argument.
In its elements, the project is simple and obvious, but its working out will
require much painstaking preparation, much more than appears on the face
of this bald statement; for it also follows from the present state of the
industrial arts and from the character of the industrial system in which
modern technology works out, that even a transient failure to make good in
the conduct of productive industry will result in a precipitate collapse of the
enterprise.
By themselves alone, the technicians can, in a few weeks, effectually
incapacitate the country's productive industry sufficiently for the purpose.
No one who will dispassionately consider the technical character of this
industrial system will fail to recognize that fact. But so long as they have not,
at least, the tolerant consent of the population at large, backed by the
aggressive support of the trained working force engaged in transportation
and in the greater primary industries, they will be substantially helpless to
set up a practicable working organization on the new footing; which is the
same as saying that they will in that case accomplish nothing more to the
purpose than a transient period of hardship and dissension.
Accordingly, if it be presumed that the production engineers are of a mind
to play their part, there will be at least two main lines of subsidiary
preparation to be taken care of before any overt move can reasonably be
undertaken: (a) An extensive campaign of inquiry and publicity, such as will
bring the underlying population to a reasonable understanding of what it is
all about; and (b) the working-out of a common understanding and a
solidarity of sentiment between the technicians and the working force
engaged in transportation and in the greater underlying industries of the
system: to which is to be added as being nearly indispensable from the
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in the great generality of the mechanical industries. Until these prerequisites
are taken care of, any project for the overturn of the established order of
absentee ownership will be nugatory.
By way of conclusion it may be recalled again that, just yet, the production
engineers are a scattering lot of fairly contented subalterns, working
piecemeal under orders from the deputies of the absentee owners; the
working force of the great mechanical industries, including transportation,
are still nearly out of touch and out of sympathy with the technical men, and
are bound in rival trade organizations whose sole and self-seeking interest
converges on the full dinner-pail; while the underlying population are as
nearly uninformed on the state of things as the Guardians of the Vested
Interests, including the commercialized newspapers, can manage to keep
them, and they are consequently still in a frame of mind to tolerate no
substantial abatement of absentee ownership; and the constituted authorities
are competently occupied with maintaining the status quo. There is nothing
in the situation that should reasonably flutter the sensibilities of the
Guardians or of that massive body of well-to-do citizens who make up the
rank and file of absentee owners, just yet.
The End